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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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REALITY FROM THE CRITIC'S STANDPOINT.—II.[1]

Judgments of *worth* have much more to do with shaping the philosophical thought of our time than judgments of *reality*. Systems of philosophy are constructed which leave out of consideration altogether the existence of a non-mental, physical world. This omission only goes to show the annihilating force of the assumption, now in the ascendant, that reality is *human* in character, not another order of existence with which we have to seek a somewhat distinct acquaintance. That larger and more comprehensive view of the facts of life and of knowledge —generally known as philosophical criticism—is supposed to have revealed the short-comings and over-reachings of traditional realism or perceptionism, in a way not calculated to insure its return to favor. The doubt which was thus cast at first on the abstract possibility of 'external perception' soon spread to the concrete fact itself and enveloped it in mist.

The result was that the physical world gradually ceased being regarded as a datum prior to consciousness, and became for the philosopher a *situation* which he might exploit to his own personal advantage, but never intimately know on its own account. The present tendency to select the *useful* rather than the *real* for the building-material of philosophy owes its origin, therefore, to an initial act of faith in the destructive power of criticism. It is only an acute instance of the wide-spread lack

[1] See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910.

of confidence in the outward range of the human mind. Believing himself cut off from access to reality by the impassable condition of the road of knowledge, the critic distils a whole philosophy of consolation out of the thought that, after all, it is not what we can know about things, but what we can do with them, and force them to do for us in turn, that counts in the long run. And so, when Mahomet could not go to the mountain, the mountain was made to come to Mahomet. In the new view of the world, reality is but another name for human opportunity.

Critical idealism under one form or another thus succeeded to the place once occupied in human thought by physical realism; and, although it must take a considerable amount of indoctrination to accustom one's self to the unnatural yoke of idealism—that of 'common sense' being so much lighter for the bearing—many seem to have fitted their shoulders to the burden with the prodigious ease of Milo of Crotona. In fact, the absorbing topic among philosophers at present is not, whether the physical universe really lies within our mental reach and grasp, but rather, which of the two ideal substitutes proposed for it—absolute divine mind or relative human experience—is better fitted to take its place as a philosophical notion and working hypothesis.

The Revival of Realism.

Meanwhile, realism is emerging from its long winter in secular philosophy, and there are signs of a second spring. The pragmatist's contemptuous dismissal of the idea that there is anything 'fixed' or 'permanent' anywhere in the world, to which human judgments may be said to bear a relation of exact correspondence, has revived that which it sought to destroy. A new lease of life has been indirectly given to the old realist doctrine that there exists, independently of the flux of human experience and of all personal interests in the matter, an unalterable system of objective truths coercing and compelling the mind's assent. Whether this incipient revival of realism

springs from the historical tendency of ideas to beget their opposites, or is merely the revolt of 'common sense' against undue repression, the fact is more interesting than its origin.

The pragmatist expresses his keen delight at the turn events have taken, and does not hesitate to accuse of 'slander'[2] those critics who dare deny him the right to the name of 'realist.' In the same breath, however, he patches up a truce with the idealist, and declares his adherence to the policy that, whatever reality may mean as a noun, the adjectives 'external' and 'permanent' should not be used when speaking of it in philosophical company. Clay in the hands of us human potters it may be, but no more; so that the extent to which 'reality' has been 'revived' does not go beyond that of the barest recognition of its vaporous existence. But why should the notion that things are definite, possessed of a constitution and arrangement all their own, be still kept under the ban in philosophy? What are the grounds for refusing the benefit even of a doubtful mention to the idea that the world is *made*? In what follows we propose to study the arguments against 'external perception,' in order to ascertain for ourselves whether the battle between physical realism and critical idealism ended so disastrously for the former as is commonly alleged. Time affords a quiet medium for judging whether a controverted battle resulted in a draw, a defeat, or a victory. Let us then to our task at once.

The Doctrine of Impenetrability Examined.

The main argument urged against 'external' perception is based on the metaphysical ground of the impenetrability of consciousness. This argument has been in continuous service since Kant's time, and there are as yet no signs that it has outgrown its usefulness as a canon of destructive criticism. Modern philosophy, be it said, is not particularly noted for regarding the principles of its founders as needful of revision, and the length of time some of its arguments have served, this

[2] *Pragmatism*, by William James. Preface.

one among the number, is largely owing to a reluctance to disturb inherited conditions. Naturally of an impenetrable character, the mind, we are given to understand, has no direct acquaintance with outside reality, and is debarred from having any by the constitutional limits set to the exercise of its powers; it is a strictly 'domestic' circle, into which nothing 'foreign' is suffered to enter. Even if a veritable reality, external to the percipient, existed, the only way it could penetrate into consciousness, we are told, is in the form of a mental image or sensation, and this would be tantamount to saying that we cannot know things as they are in themselves outwardly, but only as they affect us inwardly.

And sensations being but subjective modifications or 'feelings,' it becomes at once plain as a pikestaff, from this assumed standpoint, that the state of mind, which we call 'sensation,' and the state of existence, which we designate as 'external,' have nothing in common, and are as asunder as the poles. One may well be a sign or symbol of the other, but to say that our sensations image forth, reproduce, and directly apprehend a reality distinct from and foreign to their own subjective nature is to abut on contradiction and to cheat one's self with words. Kant is accordingly credited with having discovered the only intelligible relation between material objects and the sensations which they produce in us, when he said that the concept is furnished in advance of the particular sense-experience. Professor James is supposed to be eminently 'practical' when he argues that things are made of the same stuff as consciousness. Worlds apart, how can the physical and the mental be conceived of as actually interpenetrating, mutually acquainted? We might as well try our hand at squaring the circle.

This metaphysical argument looks formidable until we examine carefully the ground on which it rests, and then we make the enlightening discovery that it derives all its apparent strength and force from the raising of an irrelevant issue, and the suppression of the real problem at stake. It is constructed on the unproven assumption that reality lacks lustre, and consequently that the rays of manifestation which stream forth

from it conceal rather than reveal it. In other words, appearances are deceiving, and knowledge, to be truly such, must mean the *identity*, not merely the *resemblance* of the mental and the physical; and, as the contrary happens in experience—the mind knowing things according to its own nature and not according to theirs, which is only another way of saying that the *psychical* act, by which things are known, is not, need not, and cannot be the same as the *physical* act, by which things exist in their own distinct order of being—the critic reads into this fact a limitation of knowledge which is not there at all. What is at best and at worst but a description of the actual manner in which our experience of the world occurs, is thus hailed as a triumphant refutation of realism.

But this paean of victory is sung too soon, and after what is now known to have been a sham battle rather than a serious engagement. Kant thought it was all over with perceptionism when he pointed out the contradiction lurking in the statement that a thing can be *in the mind* after knowledge as it was *in itself* before. He should have first assured himself that perceptionists fathered this contradiction; but instead of doing so, he fastened it upon them, and then drew the conclusion that the mind immediately knows itself only, or what lies inside the rim of consciousness. This limitation he never proved; he merely thought he was obliged to suppose it by the presumed contradictory character of the opposite doctrine of 'external perception.' A thing should be inside the mind as it is outside, he claimed, to be truly and properly known; and from this confusion of the nature of knowledge with that of reality, he argued himself, and no small part of the philosophical world with him, into the impossibility of knowing things *as they are* at all.

But all this, as we said, is the raising of a false issue. The realist is only too well aware that the conditions which govern a thing's being are not the same as those which govern its being known, and he did not have to wait for Kant to tell him that the constitution of knowledge and the constitution of reality are distinct. The realist can see a fact as clearly as any of

his critics, but, for the life of him, he cannot understand the philosophical magic or alchemy by which a fact is transmuted into a limitation. There is certainly a contradiction in the problem of 'external' knowledge as Kant states it. But who ever stated it in that artificial, misleading way? Is there a contradiction in saying that reality *exists in itself,* and that it possesses in addition *the relation of being known?* This is the only real point at issue, and it is not touched at all by Kant's glancing criticism. To be and to be known require distinct sets of conditions. To ask us, therefore, as Kant does, to know reality other than as presented, is to invite us to make a complete fiasco of human knowledge.[3] It is a very arbitrary way of proceeding, to say the least, to raise the theoretical requirements for admission to consciousness so high as to make it a foregone conclusion that external reality can never pass the entrance examinations. The vision of philosophers since Descartes' time has thus been somewhat clouded. They failed to see that the apprehension of 'external reality' is comparative, not absolute. When subject and object are given relatedly in experience it is beside the point as well as against the facts to insist that they should be known unrelatedly. Reality is no such isolated or unrelated blank, and Kant's supposition is dogmatism pure and simple.

This favorite assumption, that we have to *be* what we *know,* and *live* what we would *understand,* vitiates from beginning to end the metaphysical argument against external perception. The critic applies his 'homeopathic' theory of human knowledge to the facts of experience, and, finding that these do not respond to treatment, pronounces the mind's malady incurable. Why not try the 'allopathic' theory, and call in another physician? The fault may not lie altogether with the patient, and injudicious treatment is a recognized factor in disease. It has been assumed for three centuries or more, that subject and

[3] "The object of sense is *that which is presented* (objicitur) to it. It is not therefore the thing such as it is in itself, but *such as it makes itself present* to the sense power, through a change which it produces in the latter." *Psychologie.* Cardinal Mercier, p. 117, 2d ed., 1894.

object must be or become identical, before we can talk about actually knowing reality, but we do not recollect having heard of anybody who established the truth of this over-worked axiom. Will some one please establish it for the benefit of those who have not the gift of such unquestioning philosophical faith? Is there no more 'independent' thought left in modern philosophy—we refer, of course, to fundamental presuppositions only —than 'independent' reality? Critical elsewhere, the critic seems to have forgotten his art and profession here. It is to be regretted that the 'man from Missouri' does not turn philosopher. His proverbial love of proof would find frequent occasion for expression, if he did, and the critic would not find it so easy a matter to escape in the dust of his own raising.

Thus the main principle[4] on which idealists rely for the refutation of external perception melts away under examination into a glaring assumption. Not a shred of proof is offered in support of the axiom that consciousness is impenetrable; not a hand is turned to establish the presupposition that knowledge is a fusing process in which subject and object gradually cease to be two, and become one. We are supposed to take all this for granted, and to bring in the Scotch verdict of "guilty, but not proven" against realism. This tendency to make much of principle and correspondingly little of fact accompanies even the details in which the anti-realist argument is worked out, and of these a passing word to the wise will prove sufficient.

The statement, for instance, that the object cannot penetrate into consciousness without becoming 'image' or 'sensation' in so doing, is one to which no exception can be taken by anybody who understands the terms. No one, so far as we know, has ever denied it, though we must confess that those who flaunt this truism in our faces, seem to be under the impression that somebody, the realist, perhaps, is being hard hit. If there be a realist of this type still surviving, we join heartily in the request to have him stand out of the light. It is a plain matter of psychology that *physical* facts have to become *conscious* facts,

[4] Kant's arguments against the reality of a temporal and spatial world will be considered in their proper place.

if they are to be known at all. It is notorious, furthermore, that the outer universe cannot move over with all its belongings into the cramped quarters of the human consciousness, and nobody expects any such miraculous performance on its part. It is by its *actions,*[5] that the object penetrates into consciousness, not by its bodily substance whole and entire. This action of the object becomes the conscious reaction of the subject, and what is this but another way of saying that the two participants in the knowledge process disclose their respective identities without exchanging or forfeiting them in so doing? In other words, the act of knowing and the fact of being are irreducibly distinct, and the mutual transfer of these two modes of existence, so far from being necessary to the acquisition of real knowledge, is a wholly superfluous requirement, impossible of fulfilment, the world remaining as it is, and we continuing as we are.

Sensation and Object.

But good psychology often makes bad philosophy. When the idealist insists that the *external* object, to be known, must become a conscious fact or a fact of consciousness, the statement is psychological and true so long as it remains simply affirmative, but it takes on a metaphysical and assumed character the moment it is made to bear an exclusive meaning. As it stands, the statement is neither a proof of idealism, nor a disproof of realism, but an inoffensive fact of observational psychology, as yet uncolored by any theory. To say that sensation is exclusively self-referent, purely subjective, and naturally self-limited means therefore that we no longer speak as psychologists who observe, but as metaphysicians who speculate out of due time. The thought in the back of our mind expels the thought that is in the front, and the expulsive power of a preconceived idea is notoriously like that of a new affection. To realize that this is so, we have but to watch with what ease the idealist converts his propositions.

[5] *Théorie fondamentale de l'acte et de la puissance.* A. Farges, 7me édit., Paris, 1909. Also "L'Union du sujet et de l'objet dans la perception des sens externes." *Revue de Philosophie,* Avril, 1909, Mai, 1909.

The inclusive statement, that the external object is *also* a subjective fact, becomes at once converted into the exclusive proposition, that the external object is *nothing but* a subjective fact; the first part of the statement being a positive half-truth, the second part a striking example of the illegitimate conversion of propositions, which has been practised since Kant's day. Who has ever proved this limitation, by showing that perception *ends at* the sensation, and not at the object *presented in it?* Yet this is the whole question, which is begged outright at the start by the unproven assumption that the method of our knowing implies a limitation of our knowledge. The point at issue is, whether our sensations merely reveal *themselves,* or something *else* at the same time; whether we are made conscious *only* of our own modifications, or *also* of something outside that is producing these modifications within. If human knowledge is essentially limited to objects in the mind's interior, and we deny point blank that it is, this limitation has too many consequences following in its train to be nonchalantly taken for granted. A boundary question of such magnitude and importance must be investigated, not settled in advance by an axiomatic untruth.

The complacency with which the philosopher assumes, without the least semblance of proof, that sensation constitutes the only reality with which we are or can be directly acquainted, is equalled only by the naïveness of his procedure in citing the fact, that knowledge first comes to us in the form of sensation, as proof of the theory that the *means* of knowledge are also its *term* and *limit.* We hear altogether too much to-day about the impossibility of the extra-mental 'leap' of realism and too little about the intra-mental 'flop' of idealism. This metaphor of the 'jumper' can be retorted with equal vividness of imagery against its employers who persistently confound judgments of nature, which are mediate, with judgments of existence which are of an immediate character. The edge of the metaphysical argument against external perception is likewise equally capable of being turned and blunted. Professor Fullerton neatly retorts the sacrosanct half-truth of idealism,

"There is no experience of the world where there is no sensation," by completing the statement so as to make it read, "There is no sensation, that can be recognized as such, where there is no experience of the world." [6] Denial of the first statement is not necessary. Who but Kant, hard pressed by Hume, could ever have imagined a world to be known otherwise than through sensation? All we have to do therefore is to make related again in our thought the world which Kant conceived as utterly unrelated and inaccessible. When this is done by a complete statement of the facts of knowledge, we find that we are immediately acquainted with more than 'images' and 'sensations,' that we know a complex something distinct from our ideas, and that the distinction between the physical and the mental, so far from being *beyond* experience, as idealists are fond of alleging, is an essential part of the very constitution and structure of human experience itself.

Direct and Reflex Sight.

We are invited by the idealist to see an additional proof of his position in the fact that, when we exercise our *reflex* consciousness, we are immediately aware of sensations only. The fact is true, but entirely beside the point, and so proves nothing. If consciousness were always reflex, and never direct or spontaneous, we should all have to admit idealism and seek immersion in its regenerating waters. Was it not Hume who said that he could never observe anything but the perception? He was speaking of the reflex consciousness, which is the only kind philosophers of the day consent to talk about, and the same fate that awaited him still awaits any man who makes a like misdirected attempt. But we do not begin our knowledge by reflecting. Sensation does not come to us at first as the object of reflex consciousness, but as something of which we are not aware at all. What we first know is objects, not ourselves; and we wonder why this early relation of our sensations to the objects which arouse and determine them, fails to receive from

[6] "Essays Philosophical and Psychological." *The New Realism*, p. 33.

philosophers anything more than an indifferent glance accompanied by a patronizing smirk.

That we acquire our idea of 'external object' from this early relation of which we are conscious—from immediate perception, in other words—is a thesis which might well be established, if all other proof were lacking, by the fact of history that no one has yet been able to show how we could ever have acquired it otherwise. We decline therefore the invitation of the critic to help him find external reality by a process of self-contemplation. There is no use looking inward for what is to be found only by looking out. We ourselves, our own acts, are the objects immediately perceived when we reflect, and he who tries to discover outer reality by contemplating himself, will soon find that he is about all the reality left for direct contemplation. But, again, who has ever proved that consciousness is first, last, and always self-awareness, that it is always psychological or reflex, and never ontological or direct? We make ourselves the victims of theoretical limitations, and then say we cannot see, when the real fact of the matter is that we can, but will not.

Though refusing the invitation of the idealist to live with him in the halls of introspection, we tender him one in turn, and ask him to go back with us to the spontaneous stage of consciousness where object after object crowds the vision in utter despite of all man-made prohibitions. He ought to feel quite free to accept the invitation, seeing that the pragmatist has already gone there for his view of the world and all things in it. More especially as we do not ask him to hark back to the pure wells of knowledge, in the spirit of the pragmatist, to collect further proofs of the mind's limitation—philosophy has been so long on the hunt for limitations that it has lost the scent for other game—but to find out what the possibilities really are. In this prereflexive stage we find ourselves no longer in the closed circle of the psychological consciousness, but in the open field of objective vision, so long neglected by philosophers that it wears an abandoned look. What do we discover here? Merely the rough stuff out of which thoughts and things are afterward to be fashioned? The pragmatist is content with

this vague discovery, but there are those who think that he merely looked for what he wanted, found it, or thought he did, and hurried back to tell the idealist that he had come upon reality in the making, and that philosophy would have to be reformed. But we are not on a foraging expedition, and so we can afford to take our time. What are you directly conscious of here where you do not yet reflect, we ask our critical guest. "Of objects," he replies. And of what were you directly aware in the self-reflecting region of the mind which you just left? "Of my own acts, and sensations." So far, so good. Then there are two aspects to consciousness, and why do you persist in selecting only one? The nature of sensation is not reducible to either of these two; both must be retained as essential, the inward as well as the outward reference, the objective no less than the subjective aspect. There is a basic connection between these interior and exterior references of your sensations, which you have no right to disregard. It is wrong to invert the chronological order of their appearance in consciousness, and to expect that the 'object' should justify its presence to reflex sight as it does to direct vision. The 'object' proves an alibi against those who look for it in the reflex consciousness.

Spontaneous and Reflective Perception.

But our invited guest, if an idealist, is unwilling to entertain this alibi, and protests against its acceptance. It seems to him like throwing criticism to the winds to adopt a spontaneous notion, like that of external reality, at its full face value, and to begin his philosophy with it. His acquired metaphysical prejudices are too strong for any such genuine acknowledgment on his part. He cannot be made to see that criticism comes rightly after the spontaneous facts of consciousness, and not before; that it is a sifting, not a prejudging process; that we cannot act as reflective critics until matter is furnished for reflection; and that critics themselves should take things as they find them, and knowledge as it comes,fitting their philosophy to the facts, not the facts to their philosophy.

Now, knowledge does not first come to us over the brightly lit road of reflection, but through sensations that are vague and somewhat ill defined. The repetition of this main thought may sound as tedious as the sportsman's continual reference to the old grouse in the gun room, and the reader may tire of hearing it as Aristides did of being called 'the just,' but where ignoring has become a philosophical virtue, repeating ceases to be a literary crime. Originally we are not aware of ourselves as reflective beings, but of things other than ourselves; and this dual character of human awareness develops into an ever-increasing distinctness with the years; for, it is not in knowing ourselves only that the great world of reality is built up again within us into a world of knowledge, but in knowing things also.

It is dogmatism, not criticism, therefore, to proceed upon the supposition, as modern philosophers invariably do, that progress consists in eliminating from human knowledge every vestige and trace of dualism. This supposition is only another one of those mountainous assumptions for which there seems to be no warrant but the reverence for great names. It is not in eliminating, but in appreciating, *more finely and less grossly* than either Descartes or Kant succeeded in doing, this twofold reference of experience, that progress may be truly said to consist. There is a real, objective framework to all our knowledge—lines, so to speak, which we do not draw at random, but laboriously retrace. Nature may furnish at first but the barest sketch, the dimmest outline, yet, on the other hand, we experience no liberty to manufacture the details out of whole cloth. Why then refuse to knowledge its own spontaneous initiative, and seek to handicap it in its course by giving to our theories a previous lead which it cannot possibly overcome? The prompt and unvarying reply of the idealist is that we are compelled to choose between a world of reason and a world of unreason. Philosophy, he protests, can have nothing to do with 'brute facts' of sensation and 'untransformed' feelings *as such*. Let the pragmatist have that unreclaimed territory all to himself. He is an irrationalist anyhow, finding reason

good enough, it would seem, to establish pragmatism, but not quite good enough to accomplish anything else since time and philosophy began.

Strange to say, the idealist who rejects the whole, and the pragmatist who accepts only a part, of the evidence at hand in favor of the *real existence of objects* are both animated by the same controlling prejudice, notwithstanding the differences into which their respective conclusions eventually shade. The preaccepted doctrine in each case is the *irrational, unintelligible character* of spontaneous, as compared with reflective, perception. An imaginary line is drawn through consciousness, forming a sort of mental equator, and suggesting a north and south pole of thought for discovery to these captains courageous of opposed philosophies. Bradley, and idealists generally, range themselves above this line, and push their philosophical explorations into the farthest north. In this *superrational* region, not subject to the law of contradiction, they claim to have found an ' absolute,' in which our broken individual experience is generously mended, and put together again as a united whole. Bergson and James keep well to the southward of this dividing line, but they, too, have their no man's land in which the law of contradiction is not in force. This is none other than the *subrational* underworld of feeling, where the secret springs of knowledge lie, and where " a stroke of intuitive sympathy " [7] is as potent as the rod of Moses, apparently, in starting the flow of the ' stream ' called human experience.

Is there any such hard and fast line dividing human consciousness into the separate hemispheres of reason and unreason? This is the central question into which the whole controversy refunds. It is usually taken for granted, by both parties to the dispute, that reflection is entirely absent from spontaneous perception, that sense and intelligence are to be driven tandem, not abreast, and that sensation and conception occupy adjoining, but separate fields of activity. This triple

[7] *A Pluralistic Universe.* William James, p. 263.

assumption has no support, psychological or real. Perceptions there are indeed which we call spontaneous, and others which we designate as reflective, but they are not mutually exclusive opposites, and there is no solid wall of partition looming up between them. In the dumb awakening of the child to consciousness, sense and intelligence are found acting together, not apart. In the very first object encountered, the child "meets and greets" the real world of his maturer years, with all the "categories of the understanding," from externality to substance and causality, contained in the sensation which he experiences.

The behaviour of the child mind cannot be explained on the low plane of animal psychology, where image, desire, and action, with no apparent concern about the reality or unreality of the object, complete the mental circuit, and close it, until a new excitant opens it again into a repetition of the same limited process. The animal has not "the infinite in perspective" as man has, and in this respect the child is truly father to the man. Under and through the picturesque features which sight discloses, reason is at the same time searching for reality as distinct from impression, groping with a dim light, if you will, through all the blinding brilliancy of sense, for that fundamental element of Being, the notion of which is destined later to run like a connecting thread through all the operations of the mental life, forming the solid ground of judgments the inspiration of reasonings, and marking the pathway of man through the indefinite to the Infinite.

What right therefore has any philosopher to divide the indivisible, and to draw a dead man's line through human consciousness? The complete return of the mind upon itself and its own acts is one thing; its knowledge of what is going on within itself—the impressions that are being made upon it from an outside source—quite another. It is not necessary that the wheel should swing full circle all at once. The rudimentary attention, reflection, or intelligence that accompanies all our acts, sensation among the number, is not to be denied on the plea that it does not chance to measure up to the devel-

oped power of self-reflection characteristic of maturer years. The fallacy of separatism, antithesis, and exclusion, let us hope, has seen its day. It consisted, and unhappily still consists, in locking up the two powers of reflection and perception in non-communicating compartments, and in forcing upon us a choice that is not real, but fantastic. Make intelligence compenetrate sense, from first to last, in theory as it does in fact; cease regarding the human mind as honeycombed with contiguous cells, like a hive, and it will no longer be made falsely to appear as a house divided against itself.

There is an intuitive power of reason, none the less so because generally unacknowledged, which penetrates in and through sense to the underlying reality of things, and does not stop, half way, at mere appearances. The gross confusion of 'reason' with 'reasoning,' as if reason never 'saw' for itself, but always 'inferred' from something else, has done a great deal to prevent the recognition of this penetrative power of the intellect when acting conjointly with sense. To this confusion may be traced the unfounded notions that spontaneous perception is irrational, and that the mind has to transform or alter the sense data in order to render them intelligible, when the plain, unvarnished fact of the whole matter is that the mind has simply to go through a process of *selective thinking,* with a wary eye all the while to the incompleteness of the analysis which it is making. The attempt to make reason or intelligence play second fiddle to sensation, and strike a discordant note in so doing, is consequently the most uncalled-for and unworthy of procedures to which the mind philosophical has yet descended. Dear to idealist and pragmatist alike is this flower of the flock of assumptions. By means of it, the human intellect is exhibited as the easy victim of circumstances, unable to force its way through the 'crowd' of sense-impressions, circling about always in vain quest for an opening, yet never finding any through which it may effect a passage.

How utterly lost is the sense of fact in all this self-indoctrination! We employ discursive reason to remedy the shortcomings of intuition, not for the sole sake of reasoning, which

is not an end in itself. And if, in the course of the history of philosophy, reasoning has been wrongly employed as an end in itself, rather than as a means to further intuition, which is its true conception and function, let the blame be rightly placed where it belongs, on the shoulders of Descartes, and Kant, and those who follow in their steps. Not all "the fathers ate sour grapes," and hence the teeth of some of the children escaped being "set on edge." No such primacy of the *reasoning* faculty was ever advocated by Saint Thomas or the schoolmen, and it is the irony of fate, as well as the proof of pretty poor scholarship, that the 'modernist' and the pragmatist should accuse these mediæval masters of analysis with the worship of the syllogism. The scholastic doctrine is that all our mental processes are continuous and distinct, none of them being regarded as divided or opposed, and that the intuitive intellect, not discursive reason, is the primate of this hierarchy. There is therefore no need to choose between a northern and southern hemisphere of consciousness, between the rational and the irrational in experience. Such a false choice vanishes with the theory of a divided mind on which it is based. It has been remarked by a witty American that, in a point of view, everything succeeds in getting itself considered but the point. The quotation needs no apology. We have yet many mental inches to grow, all of us, in the critical habit of making due allowance for the particular angle from which our views are taken.

Are Objects Made by our Knowing Them?

Somewhat different from the uncompromising attitude of the idealist just mentioned and condemned is the neutral position—let us call it such for the moment, though it is only another acute extreme—which the pragmatist takes with regard to the existence of a reality not ourselves. Occupying a supposed middle ground between absolute idealism and natural realism, whence he is able to criticize both without sympathizing wholly with either, the pragmatist rejects the 'internal

absolutes' of the former, and the 'externally perceived things' of the latter, with equal scorn, and jumps at once to the conclusion, inviting his two opponents to do the same, that reality is as incomplete and unfinished by its very nature as the first glimmering knowledge of it which comes to us in sensation. Our first spontaneous perceptions of objects, he remarks, are all vague, confused, shapeless, and indistinct. They reveal nothing as continuously being, but, on the contrary, everything as perpetually becoming. The essence of reality is, therefore, not to *be,* but to *become.* From the first statement, which is more or less a description of fact, and the second, which tries to make a partisan *inference* pass for an objective *truth,* the conclusion is drawn that "the world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands." [8]

These final touches, so the story runs, are given by our *judgments,* in which a concentrated effort is made to put together again the unbroken and pure reality which we *immediately experience* before *conception* has torn it to tatters. A shattered mirror will enable us to understand the drift of the pragmatist's thought. And these later efforts of ours at tearing and mending the seamless reality presented to us in pure experience, what are they? Not real *sources* of information about reality at all, but mere practical *devices* which we employ to introduce permanence into a situation where all is change, difference where all is continuity, order where none exists beforehand. It is we ourselves, therefore, by the artifices of rational conceptions, who cut up, arrange, parcel out, individualize, and make over to our suiting, the 'pure reality,' the 'vague stuff,' the 'raw material' of our original impressions, which is all that we genuinely and truly perceive of the world about us, from first to last, according to James and Bergson. It is clear that there is no room in such a theory for 'external' reality, or 'determining' objects, or 'constituted' things. In fact, 'things' are only so much "observed behavior" [9] according to this view—glimpses which we catch, and vainly try to

[8] *Pragmatism,* by William James, p. 257.
[9] *Development and Evolution,* by Baldwin, p. 271.

frame, of a careering world that will not stand still long enough for the mind to take its picture with anything like a resemblance to the fugitive original. All references of knowledge to the outside, to anything but itself and its own creative processes, become absurd when considered from this standpoint. It is useless to talk of perceiving external reality, when it is we who actually make it, if not in the rough, at least in the finished product that goes by that name. The notion of 'being' must accordingly be stricken off the list of available categories, if the pragmatist has his way and say about it.

It is not likely, however, that he will have either. There are so many valid counts in the indictment to be framed against the New Philosophy that any impartial philosophical jury would not hesitate to return a true bill. First and foremost among these is the unpardonable fault of converting a harmless bit of *descriptive psychology*, such as the vagueness of our early impressions, into a *metaphysical doctrine* of the essence of reality and the constitution of the universe at large. *Non ex quovis ligno fit Mercurius.* The confused state of our primitive perceptions is no new discovery of James or Bergson. Saint Thomas was well aware, and, for that matter, so was Aristotle before him, that both sense and intelligence [10] begin their unfolding with confused perceptions of universal or integral wholes; [11] that these 'wholes' or objects are known under the two aspects of being and becoming; and that the world of men and things first impresses itself on the child mind as a shifting scene where the continuity is vague and quivering, and the particulars indistinct. But over and above all this there was another empirical fact which did not escape the observation of Saint Thomas. It has a decisive bearing on the issue raised by James and Bergson, though these two philosophers conveniently neglect to take it into account, perhaps because it would ruin their contention utterly. The neglected fact to which we refer is the *unfinished character* [13] of the act of sensation.

That the solution of the problem of human knowledge is

[10] *Sum. Theol.*, I[a], LXXXV, 3, c.
[11] *Ibid.* [12] *Ibid.* [13] *Ibid.*

wrongly made to consist in the elimination of the notion of permanent being, may readily be seen. An impartial analysis of experience reveals *confused* perceptions of Wholes and *distinct* perceptions of Parts. The psychologist must *recognize* this double fact, and no critic is at liberty to deny it, or to reduce any part of it to relative insignificance, under the pretext of *explaining* what takes place. But it is just this liberty which the pragmatist takes with the facts of experience, in order to be rid once for all of the notion of Being, and to bow down in undisturbed worship of his idol of Becoming. The confused perceptions of 'wholes' are for him reality-in-the-rough, as it first comes to the mind's mill, and the distinct perceptions of 'parts' are reality as it looks when turned into a finished fabric, after human thought has worked upon it. This attempt to deprive the perceived 'wholes' of all substantial significance, and to contrast their 'thinness' unfavorably with the 'thickness' of the perceived 'parts,' is only another attempt to divide the indivisible, and to interrupt the continuous. There is no such dualism of the empirical and the rational, the perceptual and the conceptual, the natural and the artificial, to be found in the successive 'experiencing' of a whole and its parts, as might easily be seen by the pragmatist himself, if he consulted experience, and stated completely what he found there, instead of drawing so heavily for the occasion on the inherited stock of prejudice which he dignifies by the name of criticism.

In an article written long before Descartes, Kant, and the other mutilators of human experience had begun to ply their trade, Saint Thomas,[14] in answer to the question, Can the mind understand several things at one and the same time—the 'whole' and its 'parts,' for instance—replied with a distinction drawn from experience, and not made for the occasion, which saved the day then and redeems it now. The parts, he said, are simultaneously *known* in a confused way as coexisting in the perceived whole; but to be *understood* in a distinct manner, each has to be considered in turn on its own specific account,

[14] *Sum. Theol.*, I[a], LXXXIV, 4, c; ad. 3.

and this distinct knowledge of part as part is not simultaneous, but successive. This fact of perceived *coexistence* is sufficient of itself to nullify the contention of the pragmatist that objects come to us utterly empty and unfinished, and that we fabricate them ourselves out of next to nothing. Our primitive perceptions of a man's figure, the color of a flower, the stones of a dwelling, the sound of a clock may not come to us sharply defined, but then again they are not so absolutely indistinct as the pragmatist would make them out to be, the perceived wholes are more than "ciphers with the rim off," more than "airy nothings to which we give a local habitation and a name." Saint Thomas, true to experience, makes our confused perceptions of 'wholes' cover also their respective 'parts' simultaneously. He did not attempt to separate two things that overlap. The pragmatist first states the facts of our dawning knowledge disconnectedly, incompletely, and then builds a universal philosophy on his error of procedure.

So that the phrase 'unconstituted objects,' now so triplingly pronounced on many tongues, amounts to no more, when submitted to the test of experience, than a purely verbal means of escape from the frank acknowledgment of external reality *as such*. It is indeed true that the 'spontaneous object' does not present itself at first blush cut completely clear from the background and surroundings which accompany its presentation; it is also true that no clear opposition between the perceived object and the perceiving subject characterizes the initial appearance of the former in consciousness. But the natural realist is not driven into a corner by either of these two summary statements, into which the scientific student of knowledge, or epistemologist as he is called, tries to condense the original message of human experience. The fact of the matter is that, instead of being defeated at this point of the encounter, the natural realist has not yet begun to fight. There is a *third* element in the perceptual data, which the two statements above mentioned do not cover, and its very presence there is enough to convict the critic of false analysis, unless he duly observes, recognizes, and states it. This additional element is the pres-

ence of *object as object,* the perception of something actually before us—a perceived Whole, in the knowledge of which we are securing a start. It is this *essentially dualistic* character of our primitive awareness that leaves none of us free to slip our cables, and embark on the idealistic sea without the proper clearance papers.

But the modern philosopher, as a rule—there are now, happily, a few exceptions—will say and do anything rather than admit this *dualism.* Accordingly the idealist 'stands pat,' like a high protectionist; the pragmatist becomes an 'insurgent' demanding the admission of 'raw material," and neither will have anything to do with the natural realist who is an out-and-out 'free trader.' To the two former, the very mention of 'external reality' is at once associated with 'smuggling.' Perhaps Professor James would also construe it as against the 'infant industries,' in view of the extent to which he has perfected the praise of philosophy out of the mouths of babes and sucklings. At any rate, the fact remains that an exclusive attitude is adopted toward the admission of 'foreign' objects into consciousness, and the reason of it is not far to seek. Instead of recognizing the *third element* of which we have spoken, the pragmatist stops his investigation at the second, and begins at once to replace fact by fiction.

Two assumptions are made to do a yeoman's service. The first of these is the familiar old stand-by that we can know nothing but ourselves, our own experience. But as this assumption is accompanied by no credentials, we are entitled to dismiss it until the proper testimonials are furnished. The second assumption is that knowledge makes or reconstitutes its objects. Now, unless the first assumption, that knowing and being are identical, is true, the second becomes absolutely meaningless. "A judgment about an object is not an event in the life of that object, but only in the life of the person making the judgment." [15] We do not need to have it drummed into our ears so incessantly by the pragmatist that there are *affective* elements

[15] *The Journal of Philosophy,* etc., March 17, 1910. "A Pluralistic Universe." W. P. Montague, p. 154.

in human knowledge, such as interest, need, utility, and personal satisfaction. What we would like to have explained is the trick of the pragmatist in making these secondary aspects of the *useful* primary, and exclusive of the *real* elements present. If we were inclined to be captious, we might ask how an 'object' can be known to be personally 'useful,' and be constructed on that basis, when as yet no notion of the personal subject to benefit by this utility has arisen for consciousness. This theory of the object as utility rather than reality simply cannot be thought through. It is not the point at issue, in the first place, because the question to be settled concerns the recognition or repudiation of really existing objects. The problem is not to find out the *internal constituents* of the act of knowledge—such beating about the bush is misdirected energy—but to account for the *external elements* which that act clearly reveals as contained in its disclosures. It is not the *nature* of our knowledge that demands explanation here, but the *results*, and these are objects and external objects at that. In other words, it is the *cognitive* or external elements, not the *affective* or internal, which have been clamoring in vain for recognition during the past three hundred years.

Pragmatism, like idealism, is only another philosophy of evasion. Its favorite doctrine that objects come to us empty and unconstituted in perception, and that our judgments really make them what they are, only goes to show that the psychologist and the metaphysician have sadly mixed their lights, confused their rôles, and crossed their points of view. "From Kant down," says a recent writer, "there has been current the perfectly imbecile doctrine that in conception we tear the immediately perceived reality into separate pieces and in judgment we put the pieces together again." [16] Thus does reason punish those who refuse to acknowledge the simple fact that human judgments merely *recognize and state* the parts, qualities, or relations which coexist and coinhere in the immediately perceived objects. The mistake of regarding the incomplete act of spontaneous perception as a proof that the world itself is

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

likewise unfinished and still a-building, seems to have been specially reserved in history for the pragmatists, James and Bergson,[17] who, in their anxiety to convict the realist of disrupting the original continuity of Nature, proceed in their turn to disrupt the essential continuity of the human Mind itself. "Verily," in the words of the old school master, "a preposition is never a proper word to end a sentence *with*." It is one thing to go back to spontaneous perception, but it is quite another thing to stay there forever, Micawber-like, "waiting for something new to turn up."

"To check young Genius' proud career,
The slaves, who now his throne invaded,
Made Criticism has prime Vizir,
And from that hour his glories faded."

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

[17] Cf. *The Journal of Philosophy*, etc., April 28, 1910.—"James and Bergson: or, Who is against Intellect?" Walter B. Pitkin. Pp. 225–231. The writer claims that Bergson is neither anti-intellectual, nor anti-real.

THE SYMBOLISM OF MANGAN'S POETRY.

In addition to the points of resemblance, already considered,[1] between Poe and Mangan, a new relationship appears with reference to the French school of literature the exponents of which have been pleased to call themselves "Les Symbolistes." Poe, as is well known, through the instrumentality of Charles Baudelaire, played an important part, though unconsciously, in the foundation and development of the symbolistic movement. His writings were translated into French by Baudelaire, who, in the estimation of Brunetière, is the first influential factor in the application and spread of symbolistic principles; and it was those same writings that first prompted Baudelaire to make known to the world the workings of his own morbid imagination, and to add to French literature a collection of poems which have fared both well and ill with the critics—poems which Robert Buchanan could not find words harsh enough to condemn,[2] which Théophile Gautier admired as the quintessence of artistic attainment,[3] and in which Brunetière saw much that was commendable but much more to be rejected as worse than useless, even hurtful to literary art.[4] Mallarmé, too, a symbolist of the extreme type, was so attracted by Poe's writings that he condescended to translate into French prose all the poems of the American author. Poe, therefore, stands at the beginning of the symbolistic movement in French literature. His relation to the "Symbolistes" is similar to that of Mangan to the Celtic symbolists of to-day. Poe's influence, however, was more direct and more marked in its effect. But the point to be accentuated here is that the qualities concerning

[1] See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1909.

[2] *The Fleshly School of Poetry*, p. 16. By Robert Buchanan.

[3] Baudelaire: *Oeuvres, Les fleurs du mal*, Paris, 1888. *Charles Baudelaire*, par Théophile Gautier.

[4] *L'Évolution de la poésie lyrique en France au 19e Siècle*, p. 231. Par Ferdinand Brunetière, Paris, 1895.

which Poe and Mangan are most in harmony are precisely their points of closest contact with the symbolists.

Before taking up these points in detail it is necessary to determine with some degree of exactness just what is meant by symbolism in literature. And here we come upon no easy task, for the symbolistic movement, being an actual living reality of the present moment, has not yet arrived at that state of fixedness which we are accustomed to look for in studying the history of any department of human thought or action, and is, therefore, constantly undergoing new modifications. Even the most loyal defenders and exponents of the principles of this school are the first to admit that anything like a definite and accurate formulation of the symbolists' tenets is extremely difficult. The very first words of Mr. Gustave Kahn's book, *Symbolistes et Décadents,* are these: "Ce sont les Goncourts . . . . qui affirmèrent qu'il était beaucoup plus difficile de reconstituer une époque toute récente que de reconstruire, avec quelques chartes ou inscriptions, l'histoire d'une époque mythique ou féodale." [5] And further on he observes: "Une objection plus grave à une histoire du symbolisme, et celle-là je la déclare tout de suite tres valable, c'est que l'evolution du symbolisme n'est pas terminée." [6]

In the present consideration, therefore, the aim is simply to indicate a few of what seem to be the more important principles underlying the whole movement,—and these with special reference to their earlier and less complex manifestations, because it is here that the basis for a comparison of the symbolists with Mangan or Poe is most evident.

Symbolism, then, rests first of all on the comparative superiority of spirit to matter. The world within us, the world of the soul, comprising inexhaustible realms of truth and beauty, unfathomable depths of mystery, is far more deserving of our attention than the scarcely less mysterious external world. And the relative importance of the inner and the outer world varies in individual members of this school, ranging, as

[5] *Symbolistes et Décadents,* p. 7. Gustave Kahn.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 8.

it does, from orthodox dualism to an extreme subjectivism which would make of the external world only an elaborate system of illusions, and material things only the vague and fleeting shadows of unlimited realities hidden in the vast and unexplored realms of existence. Here, then, is the prospect that confronts the symbolist—a world of mystery; his task—to give expression, however feeble, to the truths and the beauties he may there discover.

Thus far there is nothing which might be considered exclusively peculiar to any one school of literature. It is in their mode of expression that the symbolists form a distinct school. This mode is intended to be an appeal to the senses—not the direct appeal of a concrete definite sensation, but an indirect appeal based on the suggestive power of color, odor, sound, or, in general, of those things that are apprehended directly by the senses. The symbolist, for example, will speak of the blue or grey or black, not for the sole purpose of conveying the idea of some particular color, but with a view to awaken in the mind a faint perception of some reality of the spiritual world, a state of the mind, a truth or a beauty too vast or too complex to be defined.

Similarly sound is made to play an important part, not so much in the character of the word selected as in the use which it is made to serve in the verse or stanza. This application of sound to literary purposes is by no means the same as the quality which rhetoricians call onomatopoeia. The latter is purely imitative, and has reference to some concrete individual phenomenon of nature, while the former is merely suggestive, and refers to the psychological effect produced rather than to any object or condition in the external world. Here is what Mallarmé has to say on the subject:—"The symbolists will choose rather to suggest than to depict: they will not fear the indefinite or the mysterious. If they present an object, it will be in order that the object may call up or adumbrate some spiritual state or mood, or they will, through some state of the soul shadow forth an object. They will be charged with obscurity, but all art which demands the coöperation of the spectator's

or the reader's feelings and imagination, is obscure to those who do not bring the one thing necessary." [7] In a word, color and sound and all other things perceived by the senses are but symbols of spiritual things which human consciousness vaguely apprehends but is unable to express. Symbolism according to Arthur Symons is a representation of the infinite by the finite; and the same author gives this idealistic appreciation of the worth of the "Symbolistes": "It is a literature in which the visible world is no longer a reality and the unseen world is no longer a dream." [8]

Brunetière traces the origin of this school of poetry to a development in the power of sense perception: "Combien l'homme connaisait-il ou distinguait-il de couleurs au temps d'Homère? Mais il s'est fait depuis lors une éducation progressive de notre oeil, — comme de notre oreille, ou en général de nos sens—et, aujourd'hui des combinaisons de sons ou de couleurs qui eussent offensé le goût, je ne veux pas dire plus aristocratique ni plus delicat, mais moins exigeant et moins exercé de nos peres, nous les . . . . avalons comme de l'eau." C'est ce que l'on peut avancer de plus général pour expliquer, sinon justifier la fortune du symbolisme." [9]

Since, therefore, the fundamental method of symbolism is suggestive, it follows logically that in the meaning of this school the aim of poetry is not to teach exact truths nor to represent definite types of beauty, but to give pleasure, or, rather, to satisfy a deep-seated craving of the soul to grasp even in the shadowy forms of symbols the mysteries of existence. The following stanzas by Baudelaire represent the general viewpoint of the symbolists:

"La nature est un temple ou de vivants piliers
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles :
L'homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers.

Comme de longs échos qui de loin se confondent,
Dans une tenebreuse et profonde unité,
Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté
Les parfums, les couleurs, et les sons se repondent."

[7] Quoted in the *Spectator*, Vol. 68, p. 579. "The turn of the Tide."
[8] *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*, p. 6. Arthur Symons, London, 1899.
[9] *L'Évolution de la poésie lyrique*, p. 230.

Now, long before symbolism was thought of as a distinct literary school, Mangan had discovered the power of the symbol as an instrument of poetic expression and had made use of it. In this, however, he is not unique. As Symons justly remarks, "Symbolism, as seen in the writers of our day, would have no value if it were not seen also, under one disguise or another, in every great imaginative writer." [10] It is hardly necessary to state that Mangan never went to such an extreme of arbitrary absurdity as Rimbaud, who in his well-known sonnet, "Les Voyelles," discovers a symbolic value in the vowels:

> "A noir, E blanc, I rouge, U vert, O bleu,
> Je dirai quelque jour vos naisances latentes."

But with the exception of Poe, to whom he owes nothing, Mangan is unique in the degree in which he approximates qualities that are distinctive of the symbolists. There are few poets who appreciate more fully the manifold powers of language to "suggest" certain phases of soul-life. He does not betray the passionate intensity of a Byron; he never soars to the metaphysical heights of a Coleridge; his lines have not the finished grace and polish of a Tennyson. But these men, though universally recognized as far greater poets, are, as Mangan generally is, poets of direct expression, while he discovered and made use of a subtle power in language which they either overlooked or did not wish to apply. It does not, however, seem at all unfitting to place his name side by side with those of Gérard de Nerval, Poe, and Wm. Morris, whom Mr. Saintsbury styles "the chief masters of the verse which lies on the further side between poetry and music." [11]

It is by no means to be supposed that Mangan is consciously a symbolist in the sense in which the term is applied to Yeats or to the school of Rimbaud and Mallarmé and Verlaine. Nor is he at all times a symbolist. In fact the number of his poems which lend themselves to this interpretation is comparatively small. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that no poem

[10] *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*, p. 5.
[11] *A Short History of French Literature*, p. 525. By George Saintsbury.

of his, taken in its entirety, could be called "symbolistic" in the technical sense of the word; and yet it is impossible to read Mangan, especially in his Oriental productions and in those relating to Irish subjects, without being impressed by some points of resemblance to the symbolists. He does not embody in his poetry all the qualities required either by their theory or their practice: but in a general way it may be said that he has applied, though indefinitely and unsystematically, their sanest principles. In a word he has availed himself of nearly all that is best in their system, while at the same time avoiding many, and those the most glaring, of their faults.

On one point, especially,—but it regards the matter rather than the literary form,—Mangan stands in striking contrast to the great majority of the French symbolists. His every page is spotless. One sees there no stain of the dross and filth of life's ugliest and most repulsive phases. His personal conduct is undoubtedly open to severe criticism, but his writings considered from the moral viewpoint, need no apology. One will find no "Fleurs du Mal" to pluck from the poetic wreath which he has woven.

In his life and temperament there are many "correspondences" or "affinities with the Symbolistes." Of him as of Verlaine, though with a different objective application, it might also be said:—"He sinned and it was with all his humanity; he repented and it was with all his soul." [12] They both fostered a strong aversion to mingle freely with their fellow men, preferring to limit their associations to the chosen few. Their lives,—and this is generally true of the symbolists,—were shadowed by an extraordinary, irremovable fear of death. But with Mangan this horror was supplemented and mollified by the conviction that for him there was "rest only in the grave."

Symbolism, inasmuch as it is closely allied with mysticism, naturally made a strong appeal to Mangan. Is not his love for verse riddles and puzzles, in the writing of which he won early distinction, an indication of a tendency in this direction?

[12] *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*, p. 80.

Symbolism always makes a special appeal to the dreamer; and Mangan was essentially a dreamer. Whether he spoke of himself or of others or of his country, he first projected the object of his thought into an ideal world not altogether unlike Plato's "World of Ideas," and then sought to express in concrete language the sublimated products of his mind. Here, again, we find him in close harmony with Poe, who in his tale of "Eleonora" wrote: "They who dream by day are cognizant of many things which escape those who dream only at night. In their grey visions they obtain glimpses of eternity, and thrill, in awakening, to find that they have been on the verge of the great secret." [13]

Mangan's worship of beauty, like that of Baudelaire and Poe, has a tinge of pessimism. To use his own words. "While we are yet young . . . . beauty is our only lode-star." But when we become "hackneyed in the sodden ways of the world," when "the folding-doors of the imagination are flung to with a sound, sullen and hope-destroying, which reverberates through the innermost hollows of my heart," and "beauty and ugliness can move us no more," then "all that is left to us is the ability to ponder on our former feelings—to laugh at or weep for our illusions, as our temperament inclines." [14]

According to symbolism, the world is not so much a realm of absolute unrealities as of shadows the reality of which exists in a more perfect, a spiritual, invisible world. Surely this is a theme on which Mangan loved to dream. And when he dwells on subjects such as this, and develops them at some length it is evident that he is speaking figuratively, and is not to be taken too seriously. But if we may speak of such a thing as a poetical philosophy as distinguished from the philosophy of practical life, we may say that his was fundamentally that of the mystic, generally of the more moderate type, but sometimes postulating all the exaggerations of the most radical of the dreamers: as, for example, when he writes:

[13] Poe's *Works*, Vol. III, p. 236.
[14] *Prose Writings*, James Clarence Mangan, p. 214.

"We are but shadows: None of all those things,
Formless and vague, that flit upon the wings
Of wild imagination round thy couch,
Where slumber seals thine eyes, is clothed with such
An unreality as Human Life,
Cherished and clung to, as it is: the fear
The thrilling hope, the agonizing strife
Are not more unavailing there than here—
To him who reads what nature would portray,
What speaks the night? A comment on the day
Day dies—Night lives—and, as in dumb derision,
Mocks the past phantom with her own vain vision."

Or, again in "Life":

"O Human destiny! Thou art a mystery
Which tasks the o'er-wearied intellect in vain;
A world thou art of cabalistic history
Whose lessons madden and destroy the brain."

The main thought set forth, especially in the first of these selections is not altogether unlike that expressed in "The Two Trees" of William Butler Yeats. Even Villiers de Lisle Adam, "The Don Quixote of idealism," the man who endured with contempt what others call reality, could scarcely outdo the sentiment expresed in these lines. With him, too, Mangan might well have said: "Je vivais par politesse." For both, infinity alone included no deception.

And now we come upon a stanza in "The Time of the Roses," which might be taken roughly as an epitome of the main tenets of symbolism, and which in itself might be used as a convincing argument,—if, indeed, any were needed other than a careful examination of the poet's words,—in support of the symbolistic interpretation which seems to be demanded in the case of much that he wrote. These lines, however, can scarcely be understood as themselves symbolistic: nor could this be fairly expected from one who was not consciously a symbolist:

"Lustre and odours and blossoms and flowers,
All that is richest in gardens and bowers,
Teach us morality, speak of mortality,
Whisper that life is a swift unreality!

Death is the end of that lustre, those odours;
Brilliance and Beauty are gloomy foreboders
To him who knows what this world of woes is
And sees how flees the Time of the Roses."

Even in the prose compositions of Mangan we discover traces of the symbolistic temperament. The phenomena of the external world are constantly awakening in his soul thoughts and moods and emotions not unlike those which Mallarmé describes as the aim of the symbolist to produce. The sound of a bell, which inspired Poe with one of his best poems, has for him some deep ulterior meaning. "Many persons," he writes, "have experienced a strange sensation of uneasiness and apprehension, as it were of undefined evil, at hearing the knolling of a deep bell in a great city at noon, amid a bustle of life and business. The sources of this sensation I take to lie, not so much in the mere sound of the bell as in the knowledge that its monitions, of whatever character they may be, are wholly undictated by human feelings. . . . . A solemn voice from a mass of inanimate metal, especially when the hum and turmoil of the world are around us, is like the tremendous appeal of a dead man's aspect; and its power over us becomes the greater because of its own total unconsciousness of the existence of that power." [15] We can see here the same susceptibility, the same tendency to read hidden meanings in the external manifestations of nature and human life, that Poe displays in the tale of "Eleanora," the scene of which is laid in the "Valley of the Many-Colored Grass," where birds of brilliant plumage make their home, and variegated, sweet-perfumed flowers beautify the banks of the "River of Silence."

It seems clear, therefore, that Mangan had something at least of the symbolistic temperament. But examining the concrete applications of symbolism in his poetry, the first important fact that arrests our attention is that we are dealing with a peculiar blending of poetic elements. We find, in fact, a twofold form of symbolism the one broader and less complex; the

[15] *Prose Writings*, p. 218.

other, a more restricted, subtler form which finds, especially in color and sound, a secret, symbolic power.

The first of these forms is not the one that is generally understood when the term is applied to literature. It approaches rather the type of symbolism which Dante employs in "The Divine Comedy." It is closely allied though not identical with the allegory and is exemplified in such poems as "Siberia" and "Dark Rosaleen." These poems partake of the nature of allegory, but they are not so in the same sense as "The Faerie Queene," "The Building of the Ship," or Horace's "O Navis," for the symbol goes further than the allegory inasmuch as it is "the sign or representation of any moral thing by the images of properties of natural things." In his explanation of "le symbole," Brunetière expresses the difference as follows: "C'est une allegorie, ... mais une allegorie dont l'imitation n'a rien de didactique, ni surtout de logique, dont les differents sens, unis ou mêlés ensemble par une sorte de necessité interne, se soutiennent, s'entr'aident, s'eclairent, se compliquent aussi, semblent même parfois se contrarier les uns les autres, finissent toujours par s'accorder ou plutôt par se confondre." [16]

Let us see how this definition corresponds with the facts as we find them, for example, in "Dark Rosaleen." Though it is extremely probable that the original lyric "Roisin Dubh," had a personal application, there is absolutely no doubt that the "Little Dark Rose" here signifies Ireland. Now, to represent a nation by a rose certainly affords excellent opportunity for the development of a beautiful allegory; and even the prefixing of the epithet "dark,"—though it introduces a new and foreign element,—does not destroy this possibility. But in the very second line of the poem the "Rose" manifests personal qualities, and is entreated not to "sigh" or "weep." Even this new transition might be permissible in strict allegory; it would, indeed be an added source of beauty; and when the poet expresses the anguish that it costs him to hear the "sweet

[16] *L' Évolution de la poésie lyrique en France au 19e Siècle*, p. 249.

and sad complaints" of this dethroned Queen, whom he addresses as

"My life, my love, my saint of saints,"

the reader's imagination pictures that traditional figure, sorrowful and solitary, seated on the rock-bound coast, pining for the glories of the past. But this development is not consistent throughout the entire poem. This Queen is soon a rose again, a flower which prays, a "virgin flower," a "flower of flowers" which may "fade" and "die."

The poem is, therefore, not a consistent allegory, and yet the qualities which change the allegorical sequence are not defects: they are decidedly merits. And no one would say that the variation of figures here is a mixing of metaphors. On the contrary, this blending of figures is suggested in the very title of the poem, which is developed in a symbolical rather than a metaphorical manner. The little rose is selected because of its beauty, its tenderness, and its helplessness, while the dark color which it wears suggests the gloom and the sorrow of centuries. And the mention of that uncrowned queen, with bright face clouded "like to the mournful moon," who is yet to reign on a golden throne, evokes the sad story of the past no less than the cheering hopes of the future. Similar to "Dark Rosaleen" in their illustration of this form of symbolism are such poems as "The Hundred Leafèd Rose," "The Karamaman Exile," "The Wail and Wanning of the Three Khalendeers," "The Dawning of the Day," and the "Vision of Connaught in the Thirteenth Century."

Side by side with this broader form of symbolism there appears in Mangan's poetry a special suggestive value attaching to color and sound, which, while not identical with the use which these are made to serve with the "Symbolistes," is nevertheless so closely related as to demand consideration here. With the fragrance of flowers or with the poetical value of odors he is not much concerned. He is not as Buchanan, translating Gautier, humorously says of Baudelaire, continually "sniffing distant perfumes." But he is intensely interested in the effects of color and sound.

Of his poems relating to Irish subjects, and especially those based on Irish originals, it may be said that they are a vast picture in which the various intensities of light and shadow are presented in striking contrast. The shadows, it is true, are nearly always deep, for black is the predominant color just as gloom is his customary mood. Next to "woe" and its synonyms and correlative terms, no word occurs more frequently on Mangan's pages than those which convey the idea of darkness both in the physical and the moral world. His brightest visions,—and at times they are very bright,—as, for example, that described in "The Dawning of the Day," always vanish into blackness. "Dark Phantasies," "lampless" nights, "dimly-gorgeous dreams," "Banba's dark wrongs" are his frequent themes. And too often we are brought face to face with a melancholy picture like this:

"I turned away, as towards my grave,
And, all my dark way homeward by the Atlantic's verge,
Resounded in mine ears like to a dirge
The roaring of the wave."

The following short poem entitled "Love," which the author assures us is "from the Turkish," is a fair example of his love for color. In harmony with his usual method of treatment, it is noteworthy that in dealing even with this subject, which most poets are disposed to consider in a more cheerful mood, he cannot refrain from accentuating the darkest features of the picture which he paints; for, though the "course of Love" be as pure as the snow and its might comparable only with the intense heat of the flames, its fate, nevertheless, is "writ on leaves of Gloom":

"From eternity the course of Love was writ on leaves of snow,
Hence it wanders like a vagrant when the Winds of Coldness blow,
And the lamp of Love is pale and chill where Constancy is weak
And the *Lily* comes to pine upon deserted Beauty's cheek.

From Eternity the might of Love was writ on leaves of fire,
Hence the Soul of Love in spiral flames would mount forever higher,
And the vermeil sun of Eden won, leaves hope no more to seek,
And the damask *Rose* ascend her throne on happy Beauty's cheek.

From Eternity the Fate of Love was writ on leaves of Gloom
For the Night of its decay must come and Darkness build its tomb,
Then the Waste of Life, a Garden once, again is black and bleak
And the *Raven Tresses* mourningly o'ershadow Beauty's cheek.

O! the joys of Love are sweet and false—are sorrows in disguise
Like the cheating wealth of Golden Eve, ere Night breaks up the skies.
If the graves of earth were opened—O! if Hades could but speak,
What a world of ruined souls would curse the sheen of Beauty's cheek.

In this poem Mangan displays a fondness for color almost as great as that of the "Symbolistes." From this viewpoint, compare with it one of Verlaine's "Aquarelles" which he entitles "Spleen";

"Les roses étaint toutes rouges,
Et les lierres étaient tout noirs.

Chère. pour peu que tu te bouges,
Renaissent tous mes désespoirs.

Le ciel était trop bleu, trop tendre,
La mer trop verte et l'air trop doux.

Je crains toujours,—ce qu'il est d'attendre
Quelque finite atroce de vous.

Du houx a la feuille vermie
Et du luisant buis je suis las,

Et de la campagne infinie
Et de tout, fors de vous, helas?"

Red and purple, blue and grey, and white are also employed with sufficient frequency, and in just such surroundings as to show that Mangan attaches to color a special importance. Indeed, he sometimes pauses in the midst of a thought apparently for no other reason than to define the color of the object, and only its color, confident that by so doing he has sufficiently expressed, or suggested, the idea or the emotion he wishes to convey. When, for example, he laments over the ruins of Donegal Castle, and reflects on the blood and cruelty that have wrought its downfall he exclaims:

"How often from thy turrets high,
Thy purple turrets, have we seen
Long lines of glittering ships when summer time drew nigh,
With masts and sails of snow white sheen."

Considered from the symbolistic viewpoint, there is this defect in Mangan: his color suggestions are incomplete sketches rather than finished pictures. He has written no lines which for brevity and, at the same time, for perfection of unmentioned details, equal these of Burns:

> "The white moon is setting behind the white wave,
> And time is setting with me, O!"

lines which Yeats admires for their "melancholy beauty," and which he pronounces "perfectly symbolical." [17]

Here, however, is a stanza from "Owen Reilly: a Keen," which contains elements not frequently found except in symbolistic poetry:

> "There stands a lone grey hazel tree in Glen-na-ree,
> Whose green leaves put buds forth and wither,
> I sigh and groan as often as I wander thither,
> For I am like that lone grey tree."

These lines make clear the emotions which Mangan associated with the color here presented. He does not infrequently employ the term "grey" to express a mood, but his use of it is consistent. In his estimation "black" and "grey" are symbols of mental states that are closely allied. Both suggest something opposed to hapiness; but while black speaks of sorrow which ultimately merges into despair, grey symbolizes the loneliness and grief which come from the memory of happier times but which are not devoid of hope. When he laments for the suffering of "The Maguire"; who is wandering far from home through the bleak, cold night, he sees color in the cruel rains:

> "Down from the overcharged clouds, like unto headlong ocean's tide,
> Descends grey rain in roaring streams."

The "Howling song of Al-Mohara" begins with these lines:

> "My heart is as a House of Groans
> From dusky eve to dawning grey."

[17] *Ideas of Good and Evil*, p. 241. By William Butler Yeats.

And in "The Angel of Death," which he sets forth as "a Persian Legend" he presents this picture:

> "Lo! sight of sights, once more Azreel,
> The Dark-winged Angel stands
> Beside the tomb's grey gate."

With Mangan, green is always the color of youth and hope. The priests who will bring aid to "Dark Rosaleen" are on the "ocean green." When he looks upon Ireland with hopeful eyes he rejoices that her "years are green": then always "the clime is Erin's the green and bland."

Red and purple are the symbols of war and strife. When he would arouse his countrymen to deeds of violence he sees "the billows flashed with blood," "the red steel," "the red battle-field," and "the reddening morrow"; the Erne runs "red with redundance of blood," and lightening streams out "o'er the purple hills of Erin."

Other colors are likewise employed in Mangan's verse, but their significance is generally less marked than in the cases we have cited. With reference to the poems from which these examples are taken, it may be observed that many are translations from the Irish. As a matter of fact, color in the Irish poems has neither the same profusion nor the same significance that we have found in Mangan's translations. And even if the originals contained every element of symbolism which we have thus far considered, to Mangan would still belong the credit at least of having introduced their merits into English poetry. Neither must it be forgotten that the same predominance of color is characteristic of the so-called "Oriental translations"—a fact which accentuates the value of the personal element in all of Managn's poetry.

In reading Baudelaire's appreciation of Poe one cannot help thinking of Mangan. Indeed, so close, at times, is the affinity that one might well imagine it is the Irish poet who is under consideration. There is much in the following quotation which could be applied to him: "Poe loves to move his figures upon a ground of green or violet, where the phosphorescence of putrefaction and the odor of the hurricane reveal themselves.

Nature inanimate, so styled, participates of the nature of living beings, and like it trembles with a shiver, supernatural and galvanic. Space is fathomed by opium; for opium gives a magic tinge to all the hues, and causes every noise to vibrate with the most sonorous magnificence. Sometimes glorious visions, full of light and color, suddenly unroll themselves in its landscape; and on the further horizon-lines we see oriental cities and palaces, mist-covered, in the distance, which the sun floods with golden showers." [18]

There is another point in which both Mangan and Poe agree with the symbolists while at the same time surpassing them. We have already considered this agreement, but under a very different aspect. It is again their use of the refrain. To classify any application of the refrain, no matter how complex or varied, under the symbolism of sound, may at first sight seem to be a gross exaggeration of the term "symbolism," and the result of a strained effort to justify, even by far-fetched arguments, the classification of an obscure nineteenth century poet with a present day literary school which has not even yet attained the full height of its development. And in thus labeling Mangan's verse repetitions it is necessary to explain that we have in mind what symbolism in literature really is, and what it has actually produced rather than what the name itself indicates or what it stands for in theory.

When we have analyzed symbolism and reduced the complex presentation to its ultimate elements; when we have deciphered all the symbols, real and so-called, we find nothing very new that is strikingly important. As a system it has attempted to convey to the mind the perception of indefinite truths and beauties, but in doing this it has only laid special emphasis on methods of expression not uncommon in many poets to whom the name "symbolist" has never been applied.. It has, however, illustrated with greater force than any other literary school the "suggestive," the "evocative" power of language.

Considered, therefore, from the practical viewpoint of the emotion aroused, what, in purpose and effect, is the refrain as

[18] *Poe's Works*, London, 1873. Introduction by Charles Baudelaire, p. 21.

used by both Poe and Mangan but an attempt to "suggest," to "evoke" thoughts and feelings, truths and beauties which transcend the power of direct expression? Poe's refrain of the "Bells" is repeated with just sufficient variation of important words, to call up with equal force, in successive stanzas, merriment, joy, terror, and deepest sorrow. And Mangan, in "Dark Rosaleen," appeals to the emotions of sympathy, devoted self-sacrifice, and hopefulness. In a word, he strives,—and with a high degree of success,—to fathom the depths of an intensely passionate, patriotic love. Similarly, the continued lament of the boaters on the "Bosphorus" sounds like a smothered wail echoing back from all the years of a misspent past. These and similar poems of Mangan contain a subtle element of poetic value, which their author strives to express in a manner which bears a close relationship to the methods employed by the symbolists.

JOHN J. O'BRIEN.

CURRENT ENGLISH IN THE UNITED STATES.

In England and on the Continent of Europe generally, it is cast up to us Americans that we do not, as a people, speak the English language well. "Americans do not," they say, "use good English"; by which, no doubt, they mean that neither in our spoken, nor in our written language do we reach the plane of perfection attained in England. Our use of English is not characterized by that carefulness, that exactness, that zeal for purity of speech and fidelity to established rule which is due to the great masters who have formed the English tongue and put upon it the stamp of a fixed and determined literature. We are told that we are drifting away, at least in our spoken language, from the anchors of pure and undefiled English. Not indeed in the school-room, nor in the study, nor in the works of our best authors, are we charged with carelessness and deviation from the path of standard English, equal in purity and idiom, if not always in grace and beauty, to the best of British authors; but it is in our lighter writings, in our newspapers, in many of our magazines, and especially in our conversation that the falling-off is observed and deplored. The use of slang, and an appalling disregard for correctness of speech, even the most common and elementary, have become so universal and so dominant in our country that a deeply seated and baneful effect has of necessity been produced upon our language. Many English people have gone so far in their denunciation of the language we use as to aver that they cannot understand us, so alien to the canons of pure English has our speech become.

In addition to the criticisms leveled against the kind of English we speak, the people of Europe hold up to ridicule the manner in which we talk. It is the fixed impression of all who have not lived in the United States that, almost to a man, we speak with an insupportable nasal twang. If they would illustrate an American's talk, or even his ideas and opinions,

they begin by distorting their nose and mouth into all manner of horrid shapes in order to produce the detested, disgusting effect, which, as they believe, nearly every American's conversation causes.

This "nasal twang," however, is not to be confounded with the American accent. That we have a peculiarity of accent which is enough in itself to distinguish us from every other English speaking people, we will readily admit; but this alone, we contend, is not sufficient to provoke any well grounded criticism. In England itself there are many different accents; and, in fact, there is no language of any people spoken with exact uniformity of accent. The reproach, then, as to the unpleasantness of our manner of talking, is not and cannot be that we Americans have an accent unlike that of the English people; but chiefly, if not solely because we talk through our nose, as through an unharmonious tube.

Living in the United States one can hardly feel any sympathy with these harsh critics of our manner of speaking. It seems nearly as uncommon to us to hear this much ventilated "twang" among our own people as among the English themselves. In fact it is so slight, if it exists at all, in most parts of the country that it arrests no notice whatever. At any rate, the question whether we talk through our nose or not has little to do with the quality of our English diction, the main point of discussion in this article. One may have ever so unpleasant a manner of speaking, a harsh untuned voice that offends and irritates the ear, an accent foreign and uncongenial to those about him; but these defects of speech do not destroy the quality of his language; they do not mar the correctness of his idioms, nor the precision and flow of his words and sentences. Defects of speech and delivery are derogatory to the notion and aim of oratory, but they do not enter into literature. Some of the ablest writers have been the poorest speakers.

Confining our attention, then, exclusively to the quality of our English, especially of that English which we ordinarily make use of in speaking and writing, let us investigate briefly

the causes of our failings, and suggest some means of correcting them. We therefore candidly admit that there is something faulty in our current English. It is of no use to try to pass it over. It would be to no purpose to set out to inquire into the foundation of the criticisms made against us, or to seek to palliate, by an appeal to unworthy motives, the accusations and censures of which we must feel ourselves plainly deserving. Feelings of jealousy, national prejudice and animosity, past grievances not yet entirely forgotten, may do much to stimulate our critics but they cannot explain away failings patent to all.

What, now, is the cause of the faults which all educated people recognize in our current English? Is there but one source, or are there many? Doubtless there are many, but it is not so simple a matter to point them out. If we consider the training of our teachers and instructors, together with the perfection of our manuals, it is difficult to explain why we should be inferior in point of language to the people of England. Along these lines, surely, there is no deficiency. Our schools, and our educational system, as repeatedly remarked by many of the ablest educators of Europe, are unsurpassed by any in the world. The fault, then, must be sought outside the school and class-room.

It is, perhaps, as some little acquainted with our people and history have ventured to assert, that we do not inherit English as a natural tongue, but make use of it only as an acquired language? Is English to the average American no more than German, for example, would be to one who, having been born in a foreign country, afterwards became a citizen of Germany and acquired its language? Has not the language of the United States sprung, as by a natural growth, from the soil of Shakespeare and Milton? These questions are not open to discussion; they are not serious enough, they have not sufficient foundation to provoke a reply. Everyone, at all conversant with America,—with its growth and history, knows that English is as natural to us—as much a part of our lives, and as intimately bound up with the trend and tendencies of our minds and thoughts, our efforts and achievements, as it is with those of the best of English born.

Perhaps the main cause of our low standard of English is to be found in our strenuous life. As a people we are throbbing and vibrating with such an excess of life and activity that the marvel is that we should be able to give ourselves over to so much serious thought as to be capable of our multiple wondrous achievements. With such vast forests of material industry yet unexplored, with so many unsounded wells of treasure and wealth to entice and hurry us on, one would wonder that any of our people should pause for careful thought and contemplation. It would seem that there is no time for it, so great must be the rush for the surface gain. And yet this is not true. In many respects our people have gone far, far beyond their predecessors of other lands in thought and action. They have given world-wide evidence of the depth of their thinkings and of the potency of their efforts. To lead the world in material advancement, in marvelous discoveries and inventions; to achieve a national progress within the lapse of two centuries unequaled perhaps in the history of man; to give to a vast and growing populace a code of laws and a system of government capable of harmonizing supremest liberty with the most docile subjection to law and order; to organize and establish in a short time highest institutions of intellectual, social, and moral training,—to accomplish all this is surely not the work of a shallow and thoughtless people. Assuredly there has been time and inclination for much serious thought and meditation, for profound and varied reasoning. However, the very intensity of thought and the extent of toil necessarily absorbed in our material progress, coupled with the distracting influences of our gigantic industries and resources, even yet but in their infancy, have not failed to lead us away, maybe without our notice, from the careful pursuit of other and perhaps nobler occupations. Some things by force of the circumstances have been neglected, and notably among these has been the study and cultivation of our language.

One may safely say that it is only within the present generation that education in this country has begun to receive its merited attention. Not indeed that we have not had great

institutions of learning and able literary writers from the very foundation of our nation; but that education had not, up to comparatively recent years, occupied its due place with our people generally. All along there have been many who were well educated; but our people as a whole, amid the rush and hurry for material progress, did not perceive the indispensable necessity of a careful educational training. The discipline of the mind, and its expression in fitting language were not, as now, so incumbent upon the individual, and so desired by the masses. Consider the vast change between now, and even the childhood of our parents. Then a mere smattering of school training was all that was required, not only to fill the simpler vocations of life, but, in most instances, to rise to its higher walks. Then to spend a long time at school, or in private study; to devote the years of youth to the training of the mind,—to the cultivation of taste and style in writing; to pore over the classic authors until they had become a living personal force in one's own thought and expression, was accounted a useless waste of the best years of life. The opportunities, golden and seductive at every turn, for wealth and material advancement were so preponderant that any protracted educational preparation was reckoned an irredeemable loss. It was not uncommon to find, especially in the less responsible positions of life, men and women who could neither read nor write. Education was not compulsory, child-labor then, as now to a great extent, cursed our people and disgraced our land, and a lawless freedom like to disorder prevailed throughout.

Scarcely less harmful to the purity and correctness of our current language has been the influx into our country, especially during the past half century and over, of foreigners who knew not the English tongue, or at best, could speak it but very imperfectly. No nation in the world has so swelled through immigration as the United States during the last fifty or sixty years. Natives of every civilized country, irrespective of race and color, have given up their homes, or their wanderings in other lands, and have rushed in multitudes to America's free and happy shores. Without knowledge of our language or customs,

with ideas and sympathies generally alien to ours, with desires for only passing material gain, without patriotism, with no view to the present or future welfare of this nation or its people except for personal mercenary ends, many, we may say, of these immigrants have imposed themselves upon us and encumbered our land. It is not our intention to be too hard on the foreign element in our country; we do not wish to put out of mind or forget that sturdy, virile blood which, moved by noble ambition and aspirations too lofty in character and too rich in prospect to be wasted on the barren and exhausted land that gave it birth, came to this great Republic and has generously and ably helped in turn to break and till the wooded virgin soil; to shape and build our institutions and assist in guiding the bark of state; or to die in time of need for the nation's cause and the nation's rights. All honor and praise to these heroic noble souls! But urging the point which we are making, is it not natural that from such a conglomerate mass—from the many different tongues that have come of late years within our boundaries, there should result a greater or less disturbance in our current language? Is it not easy of conception that, with a notable percentage of persons among us who know almost nothing of correct English; who have never seen a grammar or a dictionary; who, far from reading a good English book, are unable to read a newspaper; who are content with that poverty and meanness of English that answers commercial needs,—is it not evident that out of such conditions there should arise and be bred abroad a corrupting contagious malady in the language we use? An illustration will further emphasize these harmful effects upon our language: A foreign couple, for instance, unable to speak or understand English, come to this country to make it their home; they settle in the city or in the country, as it may be, most likely among others of their kind or kin; and the first words and phrases of English which they hear and learn are, from the circumstances, the commonest, poorest, and most distorted known to the country. Slang and words never heard in pure English make up their vocabulary. Constantly preoccupied in the rush for the

"mighty dollar," they have little opportunity and less desire to improve their knowledge and use of the language; and after fifty years of practice the words which they use in speaking and writing are hardly different in kind from those with which they began. More education, more knowledge of business and affairs they may have; but their language has remained the same.

What should we expect from the children of these parents? Are they going to talk differently from their parents? Is it likely that they shall make use of words and phrases other than those they have heard and learned at their mother's breast and knee? They will naturally grow up and attend school; they will perhaps learn to read good books and papers; they will come to understand something of grammar and the science of language, of the difference between good and bad English; but the language they make use of will with difficulty turn away from that which they learned in childhood at home. When they write, indeed, nothing but good, pure English may appear; graduated likely from some of our best colleges, they may be clever in many things; they may have acquired a knowledge and taste for literature; and, when occasion demands, they may be able to produce a polished speech, an essay, or a well worded article for some periodical; but to get away from the home training in the language they ordinarily use will be nearly as impossible as to shake off their peculiar disposition and traits of character. It can be done, and often is done; but the opposing tendencies are very powerful. The training in one's talk and use of language is not essentially different from training in other things. If a child is to be well mannered and docile, obedient to parental and domestic authority, if he is to be kind and gentle, unselfish and humble in feeling and action, he must be carefully disciplined from the start in these ornaments of character and conduct. They do not usually come to one by nature; natural instinct rather rebels against these refinements; and hence if one is to become really and perfectly embellished with them, great and persistent effort must be exerted to acquire them while the child is young and flexible.

Having pointed out the main causes, as we conceive them, of the defects and imperfections in our ordinary use of English, we next come to the question of a remedy. There must be a cure for the ills that affect our current English, and what has already been said has partly revealed it. We have not far to go; the means is at hand, it is within our grasp, if we will but turn it to profit. The faults to be corrected, though they merge and widen out into the public, social stream, corrupting by constant interchanging baneful influences the whole mass, are, as every one can see upon a little reflection, mainly personal; and hence the correcting forces must in the main be the result of personal effort.

To bring about, therefore, the needed change in our current English, and to put ourselves in a position of worthy rivalry with our English brethren, more extensive, and more serious personal training in the knowledge and proper use of English is the chief requisite. We insist that the effort must be personal and individual. To what purpose are great institutions of learning, however numerous and perfect, unless one seriously endeavor to turn the help and advantages which they offer to his own profit. Education and training of the mind and faculties are chiefly one's own work. Teachers can assist, but without the student's personal coöperation the results are nothing. Our children and students must not only try to execute more thoroughly the work of the class-room; but they must especially endeavor to bring its fruits into the home and into society. If not at home, at least in school, everyone should learn how to speak and write his language correctly; this done, the next essential step is to make this knowledge practical by carefully applying it to every word spoken or written. Could our students be prevailed upon to do this; if, gradually as they come to perceive the faults of their own talk, they would try to eliminate from every use all that is not justified by the school training, the reform in our use of English would be at hand. Soon a different atmosphere would be created; the members of one's family, one's friends and acquaintances would shortly note the change; to be high-school or college bred would

begin to mean something of practical worth; a noble pride and emulation in speech and writing would swiftly go abroad, penetrating alike into humble home and stately dwelling; children would grow up accustomed to the use of pure English; and within a generation it would be as unpleasant and humiliating to be caught in the use of slang and faulty diction, as now it is to be correct and cautious in speaking.

Perhaps we are not willing to admit that, to use good, correct English at all times is widely considered by our people to be stiff and uncongenial. Though their words and phrases be the simplest, persons that are guilty of this mark of culture, are said to be "precise and pedantic." And yet if the same bold critics profess to know something of any other language, for example, French or German, or Italian, they would consider themselves disgraced to be guilty of half the mistakes in its use which they make in English without a blush. A strange inconsistency, indeed! That such, however, is the stand taken by great numbers of our educated people in regard to a perfectly correct use of English is a truth which must be admitted. It is a shame, and an evil sign. It indicates, at least in this particular, that there is something light about the American character, and something wanting or corrupt in its taste. With such wanton carelessness in regard to the surface, even among the best instructed, surely there can be little relish for the pure, deep stream below. Light, flimsy reading, and not the best authors, engrosses our attention and spoils our mind and taste. No wonder that our current English is poor, and our literary attainments low.

In order to retain the purity of a language and to advance to its perfection in literature, a noble literary pride must fire a people. When this ceases or grows feeble the spirit of a people is on the wane. Just as one feels a worthy pride in one's nationality, in calling oneself an American citizen; as one is zealous to shield one's name from reproach and degradation, so ought it to be each one's desire and aim as far as he can to guard and protect his language from corrupting and unwholesome influences, and as far as in him lies to contribute

to its elevation and beauty. To this end literary education is also the only means. It alone can stir up the ambitions and refine the tastes of our young men and women; it only is able to discover to the understanding the beauty and power of language, and the secret subtle pleasures of mind and fancy which lie behind its proper cultivation and development.

CHARLES J. CALLAN, O.P.

NOTES ON EDUCATION.

The University and the Training of Primary Teachers.

One of the most significant characteristics of educational progress in Europe and in this country during the last half century is the progressive elevation of the standard employed in the training of teachers for elementary schools. In this changed equipment of the elementary teacher we find reflected a characteristic of the social and economic conditions of the time. The apprentice has given place to the engineer. Empirical training and imitation no longer suffice. Only the man who knows the laws back of his material can successfully guide the process of manufacture. In medicine the empirical phase has long since become a thing of the past. None but the benevolent old lady now prescribes for her friends the remedy that proved serviceable in alleviating the sufferings of some ancient relative. It was to be expected, therefore, that the spirit of the time would find expression in the field of education. The function of education everywhere is to prepare the pupil for adult life, hence, in spite of the many differences which characterize national systems of education, the great underlying economic change that is making itself felt throughout the Western world demands the same adjustment in the field of education. The student of education might, therefore, turn to the schools of Australia or Scandinavia with scarcely less profit than is to be derived from a study of the problem in this country. The schools of Scotland, however, furnish a typical instance of the progressive change that is taking place throughout the Western world in the training of the primary teacher. This is all the more remarkable when the conservative character of the Scottish people is borne in mind.

The primary school in Scotland corresponds to the first six years of our elementary school and it is with teachers of these schools that we are here chiefly concerned. There was a time-

honored tradition in Scotland which demanded that the headmaster of the primary school should be a university graduate and this tradition was strengthened by several bequests which were made to the primary schools on condition that the headmaster should be a university graduate. This speaks of high culture, indeed, in the head of the school, but with the rank and file of the teachers the case was otherwise. The ever-increasing number of teachers in these schools who were fitted for their work under the apprenticeship or pupil-teacher system were conspicuous for their wooden methods and lack of culture. Their need of contact with the universities became increasingly evident with the new demands that were being made upon the primary schools through the development of the sciences and their application to the every-day affairs of life. It became evident that the professional or trade aspect of the education given to the primary teacher was emphasized at too early an age. A broader cultural basis was necessary, but how was this to be attained? A break had to be made with time-honored customs. Native conservatism had to be overcome and the machinery for the new training of the teacher had to be practically created in its entirety.

In the first half of the last century the candidate for a position as primary teacher was required to complete the curriculum of the primary school and then to serve an apprenticeship in the work of teaching under the immediate supervision of the headmaster, who supplemented the academic training by individual instruction wherever he deemed such instruction necessary. Under this system the boy or the girl of fifteen was ready to begin a professional career as a teacher. In 1834 the Church of Scotland and the Free Church established training schools for teachers in the university towns of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen. In 1855 the Episcopalians started a training school in Edinburgh, and the Catholics established a similar school in Glasgow in 1885. From the beginning of the movement to give special training to the primary teacher it was the manifest desire of the educational authorities that the candidates should have access to college classes. This desire, how-

ever, was not realized until 1873, when official permission was granted for the male pupils to attend the university. Some time later the women students were accorded a similar privilege. Thus the candidate for the position of primary teacher during the closing quarter of the last century was permitted to enter the university and to broaden his cultural education during the years in which he was required to pursue his professional studies. This brought to the future teacher many advantages. It helped to bridge the chasm which so frequently, in Europe, separated the primary teacher from the teachers and professors of the secondary schools and of the higher institutions of learning. Not infrequently, too, the stronger pupils in these training colleges added a year or two to their course and, by taking an arts degree, qualified themselves for positions in secondary schools. The less ambitious teacher was benefitted in a marked degree by the stimulus imparted by attendance upon some college course and by the university life of which he partook. Even those pupils who took no course in the universities breathed the atmosphere of culture and were benefitted by living contact with the body of university students. During the year 1904-5 seventy per cent. of the male students at these training schools attended university courses; the percentage of the women students in attendance on university courses was only fifteen.

In 1872 government training centers were established in the neighborhood of the universities with whom they sustained a similar relationship to that sustained by the training schools under denominational control. In 1905 the six original denominational training schools passed from under religious control and a new order of things was established.

The first thing needed by the apprentice teacher of the old days was a cultural education. Without this, further professional training would have had little value and would have merely served to make the teaching more wooden. A girl graduating from an elementary school at fifteen, without having come into contact with the cultural influences emanating from higher institutions, was very naturally limited to the

letter of the law in all that pertained to the established methods of her craft. Freedom from this bondage could only be attained through a liberal education which would enable her to comprehend the great underlying principles of the art of teaching to be found in the philosophy, psychology and history of education. Now, the child of fifteen with a primary school education is not in a position to comprehend this body of truth until her mind is sufficiently developed through the agencies of secondary education. In point of fact, she obtains all of this through the teachers' training schools and universities with which the schools are associated. The proximity of the university confers upon the future teacher many additional benefits: it lifts her to a higher plane of intellectual life, it brings within her reach the treasures of the ages, and improves her social condition, and not least among the benefits which the university confers upon her in the exercise of her profession is the confidence in herself which it gives her.

The cultural development of the elementary teacher in Scotland has proved to be both attractive and useful. It has enabled Scotland not only to provide efficient teachers for her own elementary schools, but it has also enabled her to send out large contingents of able teachers to the schools of England and of Canada. The results of this national experiment proved that when the work of education is lifted out of the rut of mere empiricism and placed on the professional plane, where of right it belongs, it appeals to the enthusiasm of youth and calls forth an abundant supply of worthy teachers.

The most striking difference between the training at present given to the elementary teacher in Scotland and that given in this country is to be found in the fact that with us the professional training presupposes the completion of the cultural or academic training, whereas in Scotland the professional training begins before the pupil enters the secondary school and is continued side by side with the academic work. The pupil usually graduates from the primary school at the age of twelve. Three years' satisfactory work in a secondary school is required before he can become a 'junior student.' If his

work is satisfactory at the end of this period he is granted an intermediate certificate at the age of fifteen. In addition to this, however, he must "furnish a satisfactory medical certificate as to health and physical fitness," and also a report from his last principal teacher having "particular reference to those qualities which seem to make for or against the applicant's ultimate fitness for teaching work." "With a view to forming a judgment, the teacher may occasionally, during the three months immediately preceding the application, employ the applicant in giving instruction under supervision in the junior (lower primary) classes in the school." Junior students usually pay no fees in the secondary school, while a great many of them receive from the county or burgh committee concerned a maintenance allowance.

This plan has many excellent features to recommend it. If faithfully carried out, it should serve to eliminate a large number of undesirable candidates for the teaching profession. The practice teaching with which the professional training begins can scarcely fail to provide the student with vigorous apperception masses for the assimilation of professional knowledge. It is the absence of this feature from the training which our prospective teachers receive during their high school course that is responsible for much of the ineffectiveness of the work in the training schools. Even in our teachers' training schools the practice work is usually reserved for the latter part of the course. The training for teachers, consequently, is almost as hopeless in our system as would be the attempt to train a pianist before he is allowed to touch the instrument or to train a biologist before he is allowed to enter the laboratory. It is hard for us, however, to see how the Scottish plan could be put into operation in this country.

There were in Scotland in 1909 one hundred and twelve schools recognized as suitable junior student centres, but there is manifested a pronounced tendency to reduce this number. Under a regulation which has recently come into operation the areas for the administration of secondary education have been enlarged and the authorities have been empowered to pay trans-

portation charges and even maintenance charges for students sent in to central institutions for the completion of their secondary education. During the three years required for the completion of the junior students' course "substantially one-third of the time is given to what must be called professional work—practice teaching, or assisting, study of methods, and the further study of subjects like manual work, music, nature study, etc., which do not regularly enter into the course of those preparing for the universities. As a part of the cultural work, one foreign language has to be taken, but many students take two, owing to their desire to qualify for an arts degree in a university." [1]

The schools recognized as suitable for the junior students in preparation for teaching must include English, a foreign language, history, geography, mathematics, experimental science, drawing, some form of manual work (needle work for girls), physical exercises and music. About one-third of the student's time is reserved for specialized or intensive study. Under exceptional conditions the student has heretofore been allowed to complete the course in two years, but this and other features of the situation have led to overcrowding and the present tendency is becoming pronounced in an opposite direction. Professor Snedden's forecast of the present tendency is as follows: "The total weekly hours devoted to study will be reduced, and very few students will be allowed to complete the course in two years; the amount of time devoted to foreign language study will be diminished, whilst that devoted to geography and history will be increased, especially as it is in prospect that these subjects will soon be segregated from the English program under which they have been included; and the study of English —its technical side and its literature—will be somewhat increased; while beyond this opportunity will be given to the junior to either prepare for university courses, or to specialize in some phase of art, science, or industrial work for special teaching, or, finally, to lay broad foundations for teaching in primary schools. But 'for a junior to aim simultaneously at

[1] David Snedden, *Educational Review*, Vol. 39, p. 443.

all the ends just indicated would be unwise in the last degree; and the unwisdom of such a course is becoming more and more apparent as the average standard of attainment in the various special subjects steadily rises.' " [2]

As has been said, the striking part of this program as compared with the practice in this country is the fact that the young student while obtaining academic training is given constant practice in the art of teaching. This cannot fail to be of incalculable benefit, coming as it does while the mind is still in its most plastic period. Visitors to Scotch and English schools have often commented on the confidence with which the young teacher faces the problems of class-room management. Whatever else may be reduced in the curriculum of the Scottish training schools, there seems to be a determination that this practical side of it shall remain untouched or even be increased. The extent of the practical training is fairly well fixed, but its distribution in the course is still undetermined. " It might occupy one period per week in the first year, two in the second, and three in the third. In the third year some portion of the practice should be continuous, the student taking charge of a class for a week or more at a time."

After the junior course has been satisfactorily completed and a certificate signed by His Majesty's Instructor of Schools, the candidate becomes a senior student. The great majority of senior students are preparing to be primary teachers. Many of these take only a two years course with little or no university work. It should be remembered that these students are under obligation to teach at the completion of their course. Any pupil so desiring may, however, on payment of ten pounds, be relieved from this obligation. A large majority of the students, however, apply for a remission of fees and a maintenance allowance, which usually amounts to fifteen pounds for men and ten pounds for women. In such cases the students must pledge themselves to teach for not less than two years in the public schools. The course of study pursued by the junior students depends on whether or not they take part in university

[2] *Ibid.*, 444.

work. For those who do not attend the university the subjects are divided into three groups: *a*) professional subjects—hygiene and physical training, psychology, logic and ethics, principles of education, and methods and practice. *b*) General subjects—English phonetics, history, geography, mathematics, nature study, drawing and singing. Some exemptions may be had here in cases where the previous record is exceptionally good. *c*) Extra subjects—under this head the student is expected to take some special line of work in physical education, arts, training, industrial training, etc. Senior students who take university courses in schools of art, technical colleges, or agricultural colleges, must take the same professional subjects as the foregoing group, and "whatever other work is taken must tend to form a coherent scheme of study with a view to some special line of teaching. It is also provided that students who distinguish themselves in this work can be supported for a third year of training, which may not impossibly be extended to a fourth in the near future."

To secure opportunity for practice teaching the provincial committees have the right of legal entry to the public schools, but they may be called upon to pay to the school system in question a fee of two pounds for each student entered for practice. "The practicing teacher comes under the immediate direction of the head of the school, and is appointed to observe, assist, or take charge of a class in some particular room. The teacher in whose room the candidate works is expected to make a report on ability shown. In the course of his two years training the senior student is introduced into a variety of schools. A number of the practicing schools formerly under control of the training colleges still exist, and it is hoped that these can be developed into either experimental or demonstration schools."

Another interesting feature is to be found in the fact that while the methods work is directed by a master of method, the lecturer in any special subject is required to be master of method for that subject and he is expected to follow the students in their practice work in his particular field. This arrangement

secures a particularly close relationship between theory and practice. It should also be remembered that while the public schools are utilized to give the candidates opportunity to practice, the Scotch system demands the constant use of a demonstration school or model school. Of this school Dr. Scougal, chief inspector of the training of teachers, says: "It need not be large. It should, however, be really a 'model' school—a model in respect of organization, furnishing, and equipment, as well as in respect of methods of teaching. Students should be able to see there the most approved methods put into systematic practice under the best conditions. The training demonstration school should eventually have its special separate rooms for the teaching of history, geography, science, languages, etc., each completely equipped with the most suitable aids for the proper study of its particular subject."

From what has been said it will be evident that the present training given to elementary teachers in Scotland combines a wide cultural education with a thorough professional preparation for the work of teaching. There are many features in the plan which might with profit be adopted in this country.

Turning aside for a moment from the public school system: may not those who are responsible for the training of the primary teachers in our Catholic schools find profitable food for thought in the Scottish plan which we have here been discussing? There are difficulties to be encountered, of course,—many of them: the scarcity of teachers, the financial stress and the want of adequate facilities, but it is well to have definite ideals towards which to strive, and if our situation be carefully scanned, it may not be found as hopeless as appears at first sight.

The Centralization of Educational Forces.

With the elevation of the standard of the teacher's training, there has gone along another movement which may, indeed, be distinguished from it theoretically but which in fact has been inseparably linked with it in every step of the educational

progress of the last few decades, viz., the progressive unification and centralization of all educational agencies but particularly of those agencies which are brought to bear in the training of teachers. This movement is also a reflection of economic conditions and is probably determined by them. Industry has left the home and organized itself in the factory. Organizations of capital and labor now contend in the arena formerly occupied by a multitude of individuals. Coöperation is rapidly displacing competition along all lines of human endeavor. This change is no less conspicuous in the professions than in the manufacturing and commercial fields. Even discovery is organized in the research universities and in learned societies, which ignore locality and national boundary. It was natural, therefore, for educational agencies to partake of the same general movement towards system and centralization. The universities were naturally the centres around which the diverse educational institutions gathered for inspiration and for help. It was soon seen that the isolated elementary school had no more chance of success in the field of education than the isolated mechanic would have in our present industrial arena. Centralization is necessary, but the nature of the center around which the educational forces gather is a matter of supreme importance. If the university which forms the center of a group of educational agencies stands for culture and broad scholarship, these characteristics will mark the whole field of education that centers in it. If specialization is its chief characteristic, this too will make itself felt all the way down to the primary school. If its spirit is that of agnosticism or materialism, it will leaven the whole mass with a like spirit. It is highly important that this truth be thoroughly understood, since so much depends upon it. The movement in Scotland, which we have discussed above, is a splendid illustration of this truth also.

Formerly, the control of primary schools in Scotland rested wholly with the churches. In 1834, as we have seen, the Church of Scotland and the Free Church each established its own training schools in the university towns of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen. Similar schools were established in

Edinburgh by the Episcopalians in 1855, and in Glasgow by the Catholics in 1885. Culture and educational efficiency were desired for the primary teacher. These the universities offered, but they offered them without religion, or without religion in any effective form. The students of these training colleges entered the universities in 1873. Twenty-five years later, in 1898, the six training colleges of the two Presbyterian churches of Scotland had lost their denominational character and were ready to surrender to the state forces, which henceforth conduct them without reference to religion.

It is interesting to note here the rapidity with which the denominational training schools yielded to the state institutions. It is not unlike the situation in this country. "By this time, too, the church authorities were no longer anxious to continue their management of the training colleges (excepting the Catholics and Episcopalians, whose training schools prepared pupils for voluntary (private) schools under their own control). In fact, so far as the six training colleges under the two Presbyterian Churches of Scotland were concerned, they had largely ceased to be denominational. The time was ripe, consequently, for a comprehensive scheme dealing with the training of teachers in Scotland." [3] Thus we see that the history of the decline of denominational control in Scotland has followed lines not unlike those which similar institutions have followed in this country. We are probably more keenly conscious of this change here than were the Scottish people, because of the disgraceful scramble of so many of our denominational institutions to obtain moneys from the Carnegie Foundation. The only real difference, however, between the Scottish situation and ours is that the government, through its exchequer, acted in the one case and in the other the Iron Master gained the desired control through the millions which he had made out of the blood and bone of our laboring people.

After the "comprehensive scheme" took form, "it was also provided that all sums of money designed to provide for the training of teachers, or to aid prospective teachers, should hence-

[3] *Ibid.*, 438.

forth be paid over to the provincial committees. These committees were also empowered to take over any existing training colleges where arrangements and guarantees could be made with the existing managers. Within three years the conditions for the transfer of the six original denominational colleges, as well as the training centres under local educational authorities, had been arranged. Denominational colleges can, as before, continue to train their own teachers, as in the case of the Catholic school at Glsagow, and the Episcopalian school at Edinburgh, but these, in return for the aid received from the educational department, are subject to inspection, and must meet all the prescribed conditions for teachers' certificates." [4] The process of benevolent assimilation as here outlined is very simple and very natural. The Standard Oil Company in its palmiest days never did a neater piece of work. No coercion was used save the coercion of money. The government first contributes to the support of the pupils in the denominational training colleges, then state schools are set up and subsidies granted only to those students who attend the state training schools or to those attending denominational training schools, provided they are afterwards to teach only in the schools of the denomination in question, and provided further that the denominational school in return for this financial aid submits to the inspection and direction of the state educational agencies. The Catholic training school has held out up to the present, but how long will it be able to maintain its spirit under the present conditions?

The centralizing tendency in the Scottish educational system has not halted here. The number of directors is being reduced and "in practice the director of studies, who is the committee's expert, will occupy a place of increasing importance. . . . . The tenure of the director of studies is fairly permanent, and, in view of his contact with a variety of educational institutions in his area, it can be seen that his position will evolve very great responsibilities and powers of indirect control."

The latest step in the centralization process of the Scottish training schools for teachers is thus stated by Professor Sned-

[4] *Ibid.*, 439.

den: "The latest stage in the formation of a general policy for training teachers under the new conditions is found in the organization of a joint committee of the provincial councils. Naturally the four directors of studies were made members of this joint committee, the powers of which are mainly advisory, but which will doubtless to an increasing extent concern itself with uniform systems of training, control of the total number of teachers to be trained, and the like. But this joint committee will have influence in matters of national importance and common interest; it will probably in no way supercede the provincial committees in matters of local concern." [5]

One can hardly read an outline of the situation in Scotland without thinking of a similar movement which is taking place here. Witness, for example, the centralization of educational forces that is at present taking place in the state of New York, where the power has gradually drifted into the hands of one man. The lesson to be learned by all who wish to see the religious character of our educational institutions preserved is not that the elementary schools must remain away from the cultural uplift and unifying influence of great universities, but that the universities around which the educational agencies cluster must be possessed of a vigorous religious life.

The difficulty which confronts our Catholic schools is that we have neither sufficient money nor sufficient candidates in the teaching profession to permit of their attending a teachers' training school in the shadow of the Catholic University. The experience of the past fifty years shows clearly enough that the teachers in our elementary schools cannot do their work effectively if they remain isolated from the higher centers of learning, but it also shows that they cannot remain truly religious in character if they draw their inspiration and their uplift from institutions that are non-religious or anti-religious in character. What, then, is to be done? Several courses would seem to be open to us. Those amongst us who have the means and who have the interest of God and country at heart, should lend a helping hand in rendering the resources of the University

[5] *Ibid.*, 441.

available to the tens of thousands of devoted women who are spending their lives in saving the Catholic children of this nation from the religious and moral ruin that is overtaking the multitudes of our children who are not similarly favored. Secondly, everything that is possible under the present situation should be done to put the University into touch with the teachers in the Catholic elementary schools throughout the country. Our Lord often rebuked His followers for not being as wise in their generation as the children of this world, and it behooves us to take this rebuke to ourselves. Looking at what is being done to bring the secular universities into touch with the elementary schools of the land by those who have so little at stake, we should be roused to greater zeal.

> "What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba,
> That he should weep for her? What would he do,
> Had he the motive and the cue for passion,
> That I have?"

A training college for our Sisterhoods in the immediate vicinity of the University is in contemplation and this project cannot be realized too soon in view of the tremendous interests that are at stake. In the meanwhile there is much that may be done towards the end for which this noble project is being carried forward.

University Extension.

At the eleventh annual conference of the Association of American Universities held in Madison, Wisconsin, last January, the question of university extension occupied a foremost place. A very able paper on this subject was presented, in behalf of the University of Wisconsin, by Professor Louis E. Reber. The paper was followed by an illuminating discussion. This paper in its entirety deserves careful study by all those who are striving to bring the uplift of the university to the masses of our people, particularly to the teachers in the elementary schools throughout the country. Incidentally there

are many passages in the paper that have peculiar interest for Catholic educators. The paper opens with this brief statement of the causes which led to the rise of the university extension movement: "In comparing the causes which contributed to the inception of the university extension movement with the forces which led to the establishment some centuries before of the ancient universities of England and the continent of Europe, Dr. Roberts, an eminent English educator, enumerates three new factors as instrumental in the origin of both: 'the introduction of new subjects of study; the adoption of new methods of teaching, and the growing tendency to organization which accompanied the development and consolidation of nationalities.' That the parallel is a just one as applying to conditions which have led to the extension movement in America is so evident as to arouse no contention. Modern advances in science as applied to the arts and industries; the continuous stream of discoveries and inventions; the responsibility of the individual in a democratic country, not alone for his own well-being but also for that of the community, the state, the nation in which he lives, are a few of the factors which constitute our growing demand for new subjects of study. The same factors contribute to the need for new methods in education—methods by which every man, woman, or child, under whatsoever conditions of existence, may be brought within the radius of educational influences. The third feature of the parallel fits conditions nowhere better than with us where organization is the watchword of the people."

If this statement is true of public education in this country, and I believe there are few who would contradict it, it applies with still greater force to the Catholic element in our population, drawn as it is from all the nations of Europe. Again, the state has many agencies which contribute to this work of consolidation and of unifying and coördinating the divergent elements that are entering into our national life. The Church has a similar task to perform and she must rely mainly upon her educational institutions. The watchword with her, yesterday, to-day, and forever, is organization: her divine mission is

to gather into one fold of the Church the nations of the earth irrespective of class or color. Moreover, if the Church fails in her efforts in this direction, there is nothing more certain than that the de-Christianized educational agencies of the country will dampen the fervor of Catholic zeal and quench the light of Catholic faith in the hearts of the multitude that the Church fails to reach through effective educational agencies.

Professor Reber emphasizes the fact that the tendencies enumerated above are not, as so many suppose, of recent origin. He traces them back, in fact, to where they belong, to the ages of Catholic faith and of Catholic education. Speaking of the prevalent view that popular education is a modern invention, he says: "The fallacy of this view of our activities is repeatedly impressed upon the observant in records of educational progress in the past, wherein it is reiterated again and still again that the favored few whose good fortune enables them to frequent a university or other seat of learning shall regard their attainments as a trust held by them in the interest of the many.

". . . . As an introduction to a review of the origin and growth of the university extension in England, it is not irrelevant to recall that in mediæval times the foundation statutes of the old universities, almost without exception, required that the persons accepted as students should include 'the poor,' 'the indigent,' 'the men living on alms,' in most cases the applicant being required to make affidavit to a condition of poverty. But in contrast to this requirement there is provision in several of the statutes for special privileges of the university to be enjoyed by 'founder's kin' and the presence of a richer class of students is further implied by remonstrances addressed to those who desire 'to live more delicately than suits the poorer portion of the community and make the modus of their expenditure notably to exceed that which their founder by rule appointed.' Such a reproof was administered to the fellows of Merton as early perhaps as 1284. The records show a very small allowance for food and clothing and a stringent effort to enforce on all students, in the interest of the very poor, the rule of plain living. 'The important difference,' however, in the words of

a recent publication, 'between mediæval and modern Oxford is not that in the middle ages the majority of the students were drawn from the poorer while to-day they are drawn from the wealthier classes, but that in the middle ages *the university was open to practically all who desired to learn, irrespective of wealth or poverty.*'"

We quote the foregoing statement in its entirety not because of its bearing on our present theme, university extension, but because it should be remembered by every one in this day of boasting. On all sides we hear that the Church is the enemy of popular education. That freeing the schools from the influence of the Church is in the interest of the people. Where will we find in our midst to-day anything comparable to the fine spirit of popular education that animated these Catholic institutions. Not only were the poor admitted, but they formed the bulk of the student body. Moreover, their feelings were considered to such an extent that the wealthier class of students were forbidden, by university statutes, from making the poor students feel out of place by their own luxurious mode of living. When one thinks of our own great universities in this free and democratic land in the light of this ancient example, what an argument lies on the surface in favor of a retention of the old spirit of charity and of the religion which fostered it.

Professor Reber continues: "Many conditions have contributed in the course of the centuries to the gradual lessening of the availability to the poorer classes of university privileges. This restriction has advanced so far that even the modern system of scholarship, originally intended to afford opportunities to worthy poor boys only, has been applied since the middle of the nineteenth century to the ablest candidates, irrespective of financial condition." With the departure of the religious spirit, what else is to be expected but the pagan ideal alluded to by St. Paul when speaking to the Corinthians of their games where only one may win. It is the brute struggle for existence put in place of the Christian ideal which rewards merit and striving rather than strength and achievement.

In 1850 Oxford University took up the question of university extension. Mr. Sewell, of Exeter College, struck the keynote of university extension when he said: "Though it may be impossible to bring the masses requiring education to the university, may it not be possible to carry the university to them?" The history of university extension in England and the United States is full of interest. It traces the development of the Lyceum and the Chatauqua, the summer schools in our great universities, extension lecture courses, and particularly the development of the correspondence system. "Correspondence-study, a method of popular education, which has in the past decade become an increasingly important feature of university extension teaching, was used in Chatauqua teaching as early as 1878. It is interesting to note in passing that this method, under the title 'Printed Lectures' was used in England in 1887, nine years later than its introduction by Chatauqua. These lectures were sent to remote and isolated students and were accompanied by lists of searching questions similar to those which form an important feature of the more modern correspondence-study."

Dr. Adams of the Johns Hopkins University, at a lecture delivered before the American Library Association in September, 1887, gave an outline of the English system of university extension which produced some immediate results in this country. The adoption of university extension methods was urged upon the University of the State of New York during the following year. A society was organized in Philadelphia in 1890 for the promotion of university extension work. This society sent Mr. Henderson to England to study the methods employed there. Six months after his return twenty-three university extension centres were organized by this society. In 1891 the State of New York appropriated $10,000 to be used for organizing, printing, and supervision in connection with university extension work, but no money was provided for teachers, and little was accomplished. In the same year a society for university extension work was organized in Chicago with Professor Zeublin as its secretary. In the following

year university extension work became an organic part of the educational system of the University of Chicago. The wave of enthusiasm in favor of university extension reached its highest level at a national congress in the interest of university extension held in Philadelphia in December, 1891.

Up to this time twenty-eight states and territories had organized university extension work. The movement, however, had progressed too rapidly and a reaction was inevitable. With this return wave the superficial elements of the movements were swept away. The friends of university extension slowly realized that the work would have to be adjusted to our own peculiar needs and that whatever was done in the line of university extension should be done with as much thoroughness as the work that was carried on by residence students. Mr. Moulton sounded the keynote of the new movement when he said: "As dealing with people who work for the most part under difficulties," the method must be "*more rigorously thorough and not less*, than that of other agencies." Professor Reber adds: "It is recognized, also, that in comparing non-resident with resident students it is common experience to find in the former a strength of purpose and earnestness, greatly to their advantage."

One of the main difficulties in connection with university extension up to the present time has been to secure competent instructors. Only in those institutions where university extension work has been conducted by the regular professors of the institution, or by professors especially appointed to this work and placed on the same footing with resident professors, have the results been satisfactory. Columbia University has long continued to conduct university extension courses. The courses offered are of collegiate grade, professional and technical courses for teachers, evening technical and evening commercial courses. "The courses of university grade may be taken for credit or not as desired. If for credit, the applicant must fulfill all conditions for entrance to the university. If credit is not desired, no further qualification is required than the ability to satisfy the instructor that the course can be taken

to advantage." 1206 students took credit extension courses at Columbia last year and 11,719 did non-credit work.

Fifty-four universities and colleges, in reply to Professor Reber's questionaire, reported participation in university extension work. The two main lines of extension work would seem to be agriculture and teaching. The University of Chicago has, perhaps, entered into extension work more largely than any other university in the country. "Its work extends over nearly half the continent, covering twenty-eight states, thus demonstrating that large distances do not necessarily present insurmountable difficulties. In 1907-8 the total attendance at lectures reached 53,141 persons, the average attendance per lecture was 282, and the average class attendance, 150." Chicago University reports 2,500 active students this year in its correspondence study department. Twenty-three out of thirty-two state universities are offering general extension work. "Of these, fifteen have thoroughly organized, comprehensive extension departments under the permanent direction of a dean, director, or extension committee." The work done is usually credited towards degrees and in most cases correspondence study is a regular part of the extension work. "It is noticeable that a number of state institutions are making use of extension methods chiefly as an aid to the teachers of the state. This limited field probably results from three causes: first, the evident need of some agency to assist the busy teacher to keep in touch with educational advances; second, the fact that this is the path of least resistance, extension work among teachers offering no difficult problems, and, third, on account of the organic relation between the teacher and the State University, which are evidently becoming more closely knit, in spite of the high-school protest against university domination."

It would be hard to state in more precise terms the reasons why the Catholic University should, through a correspondence study department, reach the teachers in all our Catholic schools and bring them the help that they need. It should further be observed that the general practice has shown the wisdom of demanding that at least half the work for academic degrees be

done in residence at the university. To meet this demand, the universities hold summer sessions at which the correspondence pupils attend in large numbers to make up the residence requirements. Professors at the Catholic University have, in fact, since 1905, through the Catholic Correspondence School, conducted correspondence courses with a very large number of teachers scattered throughout the area of the United States. At the present time courses are being conducted in the Philosophy of Education, the Psychology of Education, the History of Education, Logic, Civil Government, the Teaching of Religion, and the Elements of the Study of Language, but the work has not yet been organized by the University nor have university credits been given, neither is there any foundation or financial support offered for this work up to the present time, other than the nominal fee charged. In many of these respects the work done by the Professors of The Catholic Correspondence School stands in strong contrast to that conducted by other universities. The University of Wisconsin, for instance, charges twice the fee and in addition to this it receives each year a large subsidy from the state for this special work. In the discussion following Professor Reber's paper, President Van Hise stated that he expected from the State $80,000 this year for the university extension work. After describing the splendid work which the extension department of the University of Wisconsin is doing, Professor Reber concludes his paper in these words: "Difficulties and discouragements have been met in establishing the work as described. New difficulties and discouragements will doubtless arise in its future progress, but the measure of success already achieved has been sufficient to justify a belief in its future. Three forces must be subsidized for its permanent foundation: adequate financial support; close affiliation with the residence work of the university; and the sympathetic interest and coöperation of the other public educational agencies of the state."

Many additional points of interest concerning the correspondence work conducted by the universities of this country were brought out in the discussion which followed Professor

Reber's paper. "The student in correspondence work may take half his work in correspondence. The work is not, however, towards the degree, until he has done an equivalent amount in residence at the university." "But he does not receive credit on the books of the university for his correspondence work until after he has done his residence work. With regard to what degrees may be taken, I might say every department can determine what it is willing to offer for credit. So any degree may be involved."

In response to a question, President Judson of the Chicago University stated the practice in his institution to be in substantial harmony with that in the University of Wisconsin: "Correspondence work, in the first place, in order to have any credit at all, must be supplemented by examination at the university on the course. In the second place, one-half the work towards the Bachelor's Degree will be accepted by correspondence—not more. . . . . Originally only one-third of the work for a Bachelor'c Degree was credited by correspondence. But after a number of years' experience we are so satisfied with the work administered by our correspondence department that we made it one-half."

The character of the correspondence work carried on in the University of Wisconsin was further developed by President Van Hise: "In the work as it has been described in this state you will note that we have stressed very little the original form of extension, the Lyceum system. There is large opportunity for that work, but as yet we have not done very much in it, because we have not regarded it as most important. Information may be imparted by a systematic set of lectures, but that is not half so important as getting the man to do something for himself. And so as we have developed the work here in this state, our idea has been to make it educational, getting the fellow to work, instead of pouring information into him. *Our stress has been on correspondence work,* debating work, and other lines of work which put the student to doing things for himself. . . . . In the correspondence work there are, however, especially for the vocational fields, two very serious difficulties

which we soon appreciated: that the student had to work by himself, without contact with his fellows; he had to work without a teacher. This required a greater amount of stamina in him. We saw those difficulties, and Mr. Reber's idea was to establish a traveling professor. In order to do that we had to get the coöperation of the merchants and manufacturers in Milwaukee. Some of them have furnished a class-room. So the students have been brought together in classes and the instructor meets the students. That places correspondence work on an entirely new basis, makes another thing of it form what it is when it is simply correspondence work without the contact between teacher and student and when every student works by himself."

The Catholic Correspondence School from the time of its inception adopted a plan somewhat similar to that outlined here by President Van Hise, but having many features which were peculiarly adapted to the needs of our teaching communities. Thus the strongest teacher in the school was usually chosen as the correspondence pupil and a group of the other teachers formed a class and worked together with this teacher under directions from the professor who conducted the class. In this way more than six thousand of our teachers have benefitted, directly or indirectly, by the work of the correspondence school, while the expense of the work was reduced to a minimum. Moreover, the summer months each year have been utilized in bringing large numbers of the correspondence pupils home to the Mother House, or some other convenient center, where they met the professor and listened to a course of twenty-four lectures on the subjects that were being handled in the correspondence courses. Thus the summer institutes and the correspondence courses supplemented each other and gave inspiration and thoroughness to the work. Furthermore, in the correspondence method employed by The Catholic Correspondence School the professor's typewritten lectures are sent out to his classes together with a series of questions on the subject-matter and suitable assignments for reading and directions for the conduct of the class work. After the individual members of the class

have worked over the matter, they join in a general discussion of the ground covered in the assignment and, through the correspondence pupil, submit to the instructor all the questions developed concerning which further information is desired. The experience of the past five years has convinced the writer that the work done in this way is in many respects superior to the work that is usually obtained from students in residence. The experience of the other universities has evidently been similar. In answer to an objection made to correspondence work on the ground of its superficial character, President Van Hise said: "That is not our experience. Some of our professors have said to me that some of the very best work they are getting is by correspondence. When the work was taken up here, there was great reluctance on the part of some of the professors, and to meet that reluctance, when the extension division was finally reorganized, there was an understanding that no department should take it up unless it wished to. Some have taken it up and their reports are that they are able to get, with carefully prepared recitation papers and the answers sent in, thoroughly satisfactory work." In a subsequent statement, President Van Hise gave further details of the method employed and a further endorsement of the work obtained. "The examination may be in the charge of some one designated by the extension department elsewhere, for instance the principal of a secondary school; or, as was indicated, the man may come up to the university, taking it at the time when the examinations are given. Now, these are the persons who, the instructors say, are quite as good as university students. While there was hesitation on the part of the faculty to undertake it, now that the work is established and the lesson papers prepared—a large amount of the labor—I have not had a word of complaint by a single department as to the result. The temper of the faculty has completely changed in those departments that have done extension work."

In answer to further difficulties, Professor Reber stated: "Every credit student who has come up for examination has passed. This is not surprising, for the reason that every lesson

turned in (in correspondence work) is criticized with great care and every student is the subject of personal supervision and interest. It is seldom, moreover, that any but earnest and capable students enter correspondence courses for credit. So far as I know there has not been a student who has come to the university after preparatory correspondence study who has not passed his residence work and passed it creditably. A considerable number of students have done this. In several departments in the beginning there was a feeling of scepticism as to possible results from correspondence work. Those departments now admit that results attained by students who have taken residence work after correspondence study have removed their doubts."

We are not yet in a position at The Catholic University to test this matter, but it is to be hoped that in the near future our teachers throughout the country will be given an opportunity to come to the university for degrees and then we will have ample opportunity to test the value of the preliminary correspondence work. It will make it a much easier matter for our teaching communities to obtain degrees for a large number of their teachers when it is realized that half of the time in residence will suffice after they have exhausted the opportunities offered by the correspondence school.

Further testimony to the value of correspondence work was given by Professor Ely: "I was associated with President Harper in the correspondence work at Chicago. I continued the work for a number of years. My students were mostly college graduates. One phase of the work has not been sufficiently emphasized, and that is the individuality of the men. Among my students there was one who is now a professor in Harvard. He is doing very excellent work. He did his first work by correspondence and afterwards took residence work. Another is a Yale graduate who was appointed a delegate to this body but is not here to-day. He is doing very admiarble work. Another is the president of a normal school, exercising very great influence on the educational work in a western state. One is a prominent banker in New York city. There are

others who are very well worth while, some in newspaper work, journalism, authors, and so on. I had an excellent class of students, very earnest, and they did very good work."

From the considerations advanced it is evident that the primary teachers in our Catholic schools need to be brought into contact with the universities, both for their cultural development and for their professional training. Secondly, it is evident that the non-Catholic universities, while presumably competent to impart this culture and professional training, would tend to destroy their usefulness as Catholic teachers by reason of the adverce religious influences which pervade the secular universities. Thirdly, the Catholic University may accomplish all that is desired for the teachers in our elementary schools, first through a permanent institute at the University where our teachers may obtain a liberal education and a thorough professional training; secondly, half of this work may be done through correspondence courses in conjunction with summer institutes given by University instructors, either at the University or at convenient centers throughout the country. Enough has already been accomplihsed in this direction to give ample guarantee of the results to be obtained.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century (1789-1908.) By Rev. James MacCaffrey, Professor of Ecclesiastical History, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son. St. Louis, B. Herder, 1909. 2 Vols. Pp. xxiii and 487; xv and 574.

Lack of historic perspective is frequently alleged as a reason for not writing the histories of recent events; but though there may be good reasons for not entering into a detailed analysis of movements which are still in progress, and which cannot be fully judged except in their effect on the general current of human affairs, there can be no cause why such events should not be summarily grouped under convenient headings, if for no other reason than, because, as a general rule, it is more difficult to find satisfactory information regarding recent events than concerning the more remote past. These two volumes from the pen of Dr. MacCaffrey will unquestionably satisfy a want which has been felt by all who are acquainted with the literature of Church History in English. As is natural the history of the church in the nineteenth century commences with a chapter on the French Revolution. The causes, progress and effects of that social cataclysm are set forth with the purpose of showing what the social, political and religious unrest in the nineteenth century meant for the Christian Church. With this as a starting point the history of Catholicism is dealt with in successive chapters according to countries. Though some objections may be raised against this method on the ground that it leads to a great deal of unnecessary repetition (see vol. I, 51, sqq., and 205, sqq., and many other places) and that the great central ideas which dominated all the ecclesiastical undertakings during the last century are not sufficiently brought out, the value of the work as a whole is not considerably diminished thereby and something in the nature of a compensating advantage is gained in showing that, while the problems were everywhere the same in principle, the controversies, because of local or historical conditions, assumed in each country a distinctive character. In the first volume the fortunes of the church in France, in the German States, in Belgium and Holland, in Spain and Portugal, in northern Europe and Italy are dealt with

in two series of chapters. Each series closes with a chapter on the Papacy, in which the principal acts of the Popes in relation to the Church at large form the subject of discussion. As might naturally be expected, a great deal of attention is given the condition of the Church in the British Islands. The story of the great Oxford movement in England is briefly told, but its significance for the general history of Catholicism in England is well brought out. A long account of the history of the Church in Ireland was necessary to make clear the difficult situation of the Catholics under the Penal Laws, and the various attempts which were made during the last half of the eighteenth century to free them from the disabilities under which they labored. No chapters in the book will be read with greater interest nor with more satisfaction by Catholics than those dealing with the Church in America and Australia and that on the Catholic Missions. Here there is a clear record of solid tangible achievement and an account of numerical gain at least which may be regarded as a compensation for any loss of influence or prestige that may be charged against the Church in other countries. It is gratifying to find that the author speaking of the condition of the Church in the United States considers that "Socialism as such has not made great progress in the United States" and that, "though the voting power of the Socialist Party has steadily been increasing for the last dozen years, it is not likely to prove dangerous in the near future." The last chapters in the work dealing with Theological Errors and Developments, Ecclesiastical Studies in the Nineteenth Century, Ecclesiastical Education, Socialism and the Catholic Labor Movement, take up topics which are of general interest, and bring out fully the manner in which Catholic leaders, lay and clerical, have attempted to grapple with these problems of vital interest to the existence of the Church. One cannot lay aside the volumes without the feeling that the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century passed through one of the stormiest periods in its existence, and that the defence of Christian principles brought forward some of the noblest figures in its long list of devoted champions. Dr. MacCaffrey has wisely refrained from generalisations regarding results and from forecasts for the future. A perusal of his two volumes makes it clear that the epoch commencing with the French Revolution has not yet closed. A vast amount of positive information is to be found in his pages. The chapters are each provided with a select bibliography. As a whole, this work is positive rather than reflective, but it cannot fail to afford much pleasure to those, who, more or less

acquainted with isolated incidents in the history of the Church in the nineteenth century, are seeking for the general picture of that time.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Courage of Christ. By Henry C. Schuyler, S. T. L. Philadelphia, Peter Reilly, Publisher, 1909. Pp. 127. Price, 50 cents, net.

This little book is the first of a series on the Virtues of Christ. It is divided into four chapters entitled Courage in Action, Courage in Mental Suffering, Courage in Physical Suffering, and Perseverance in Courage. The theme is a practical and a timely one : practical, because inspiring, in the best sense of the word, and timely, because much of the recent devotional literature concerning Christ lays emphasis exclusively on the divine, while a still larger percentage of it, coming as it does from non-Catholic sources, lays stress on the human character of Christ, to the exclusion of His divine nature. Keeping steadily in view the Catholic doctrine that Christ is truly God and also truly man, the author of the book before us shows how it is possible to aim at the supremely perfect and yet not be discouraged at the apparent impossibility of attaining so high a level of spiritual excellence. Very wisely too, and very opportunely, he insists that in order to make the Divine Exemplar practically effective in our spiritual struggle it is necessary to supplement the teaching and narrative of the Gospels by the infallible authority of the Church as interpreter of the Scriptures. "To be willing, with a firm, unwavering will, to do what one knows to be right" is the author's definition of Courage. In this sense, Courage is a fundamentally important Christian virtue, and the cultivation of it is not a counsel of perfection but a condition requisite even for the observance of the commandments. Father Schuyler has given us a devotional work which is helpful in many ways. It instills into the heart of every reader a message of comfort, strength and consolation, and will undoubtedly have the effect of bringing many souls nearer to Christ.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Divine Story. A Short Life of Our Blessed Lord, written especially for Young People. By Rev. Cornelius Joseph Holland, S. T. L. Popular Price Edition. Providence, Joseph M. Talley, Publisher, 1910. Pp. viii–223. Price, 50 cents; by mail 57 cents.

This is a popular price edition of a work which in the incredibly short space of twelve months has run into the fourth edition, won the hearts of tens of thousands of children throughout the land, and brought to the gifted writer tributes of praise and esteem from hundreds of teachers who are best competent to judge the merits of such a work. In spite of the remarkably moderate figure at which it is sold, this edition is by no means cheap in appearance, binding, material and illustrations. We can only repeat the estimate of its contents already published in these pages (*Bulletin*, June, 1909, pp. 583 ff.) and wish it continued success.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Mystery of Naples. By Edward P. Graham. Illustrated. St. Louis, Herder, 1909. Pp. ix–349.

The author of this volume is Father Graham, Pastor of Holy Angels' Church, Sandusky, Ohio. He has chosen for his subject the miracle of St. Januarius, about which, it is safe to say, every American visitor to Italy has heard something, about which also, thousands who have never been abroad have formed their opinion from Mark Twain's skits and Andrew White's more pretentious criticism. Catholics, as a rule, have but a vague idea of what the miracle is, and had till now no work in English to refer to for information. Thanks are due to Father Graham for supplying this want. He has done his work in a thorough, scholarly and satisfactory manner. He has gone to the sources, biographical, historical and scientific. He faces fairly and squarely the question whether the liquefaction is really miraculous, and, we think, will convince the unprejudiced reader that it is. All who know anything about the problem know that the whole question turns on whether the contents of the phial are real human blood. For reasons which Catholics, at least, will appreciate, the authorities have never consented to allow a portion of the substance to be taken out and analysed. In 1902, however, the spectroscopic test was applied to the contents of the phial and the result of the experiment, as narrated by Father Graham (pp. 234 ff.) is entirely confirmatory of

history and tradition. Once this point is established, there is no difficulty in showing that the phenomena which take place "are at variance with all the known laws of nature and are utterly inexplicable except under one hypothesis, namely that they constitute a miracle or an effect produced by God which is above all the forces of nature" (p. 307). For the verdict of Sir Humphrey Davy still remains unshaken, that human blood, once coagulated, cannot be made to liquify by any natural means. Not the least interesting portion of Father Graham's book is that in which he tells of the opinions, favorable and unfavorable, of famous scientists, philosophers and historians concerning the mystery of Naples. The "Bird's eye view of the Case" (pp. 307 ff.) is a very convenient summary; an alphabetical index of topics would, however, be an additional aid to ready reference.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Wayfarer's Vision. By the Rev. Thomas J. Gerrard. London, Burns and Oates; St. Louis, Herder, 1909. Pp. xxiv–284. Price, $1.35 net.

This is a collection of twelve papers which were published in *The Dublin Review*, *The Catholic World*, *The New York Review*, etc. The "Introduction" consists of an open letter to Dr. Adrian Fortescue, the well known Catholic authority on matters pertaining to the Greek Church. It issues an invitation to examine "a few aspects of scholasticism" which are often overlooked, and which, Father Gerrard thinks, afford a refutation of pragmatism and of those tendencies which result in philosophical modernism. The substance of the whole contention is found in the first essay "The Enigmatic Vision," and amounts to this: our vision of God is "enigmatic," it is "dark"; still the formal scholastic is not farther from the truth when he describes our knowledge of God as analogical, than is the agnostic who says it is no vision at all, or the pragmatist who holds that our knowledge is personal. In truth, Father Gerrard maintains, our knowledge transcends both dialecticism and humanism. The particular point of scholastic doctrine which Father Gerrard insists on is the principle that all perfections are in God *modo eminentiori*, and that in constructing the image of God out of human perfections so conceived, play should be given, and is given in scholasticism, to the volitional and emotional as well as to the rational faculty. As he says, the "prie-dieu conception" of God should be, and is, the view which transforms

the dialectical "study-desk conception" into the truly Christian vision. The pragmatists' question "Pray, what specific act can I perform in order to adapt myself better to God's simplicity?" does not, as the pragmatist imagines, carry with it its own answer. The answer is "God is a Spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." The student of philosophy and theology must see for himself how those principles are worked out in the remaining essays. If he does so, he can hardly fail to realize that the author of "The Wayfarer's Vision" is a good guide through the realm of scholasticism, and an equally safe leader in the region of contemporary philosophy.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Heroes of the Faith. By Dom Bede Camm, O. S. B., Editor of the *St. Nicholas Series*. New York, Benziger, 1910. Pp. xxvi-149. Price, 80 cents net.

The memories associated with Tyburn are dear to English Catholics. To those, too, who, though not of English stock, are acquainted with the history of the English martyrs, and are capable of enthusiastic sympathy with the highest form of religious heroism, the name of Tyburn Tree and what it stands for will ever be held in pious memory. In the two volumes which preceded this (published 1904 and 1906) Father Camm has told the story of the English Martyrs of Douay, Rome and Valladolid, and described the causes for which they suffered. In the volume before us he takes up the history of the religious, the laymen and the women "whose last Oratory was the cart below Tyburn Tree where, amid interruptions of every kind, and the jostling of an impatient, curious mob, they calmly prepared for their last sacrifice, in sweet communion with their Lord" (p. xi). Now that the exact location of this "English Calvary" has been determined, devotion to the sainted memory of those who suffered there will receive a new impetus. The picturesque and pathetic details with which Dom Camm fills in the narrative will facilitate the task of the devout mind, which in all its acts of piety is aided by definiteness of location and vividness of personal portrayal. Henceforth, the personality as well as the conspicuous heroism of those noble martyrs will be an inspiration and an example to all the faithful. The closing chapter of the book entitled "The Good Shepherd" is devoted to the Oliver Plunkett, the heroic Archbishop of Armagh, the great Irish

champion of the faith, who as the last of the martyrs at Tyburn brings the glorious record of that spot to a fitting close.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Les martyrologes historiques du moyen âge. Etude sur la formation du martyrologe romain. Par Dom Henri Quentin. Paris. Lecoffre (J. Gabalda & Cie.), 1908. 1 Vol. 8°. Pp. xiv and 745.

In this volume the more important of the martyrologies of the middle ages, that is to say the series from Bede to Ado of Vienne, whose text in the abridgment of Usuardus served as the basis for the Roman martyrology, are critically studied with a view to showing the sources which were employed by the different redactors and the manner in which they reached the form they now have in the official martyrology of the church. The work represents nine years of unremitting toil in the principal libraries of Europe, and marks the completion of a task so stupendous that even the invitation of the Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in 1895, could induce no one to undertake it. Six different martyrologies, that of Bede, the poetical martyrology of Achery, the Lyons martyrology, that of Florus, the Parvum Romanum, and the martyrology of Ado are examined with painstaking minuteness, and with a wealth of historical and critical acumen that leaves nothing to be desired. The publication of the text of the martyrologies and the sources in parallel columns shows at a glance the provenance of the former, and leaves no doubt as to its value. No student of hagiography and no one interested in the culture history of the middle ages can afford to be without this precious volume, which, thanks to the patience, skill and erudition of Dom Quentin opens a way through a literary jungle before which the bravest might have quailed.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Bouddhisme, opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique, par L. de la Vallée Poussin. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1909. 12mo, 420 pp.

Much praise is due Mr. de la Vallée Poussin for his scholarly work on Buddhism. It is an elaboration of a series of lectures delivered in

Paris at the Catholic Institute in 1908. It is the fruit of much patient study in the literary remains of Buddhism, carefully read in the original Sanskrit and Pali. Though the author modestly gives it the title of *Opinions on the Dogmatic History of Buddhism*, it represents the judgments and conclusions of a recognized specialist based on a wide and careful reading of texts, many of which have not yet been translated into French or English.

The purpose the author has in mind is not to discuss Buddhism with reference to Christianity, but simply to give, as far as the data allow, an objective, historic exposition of the religion in its different phases. He recognizes the difficulty of giving a well defined sketch of primitive Buddhism for lack of contemporary sources. Even the estimates of Oldenberg, Rhys Davids and others as to the existence of some extant Pali texts as early as the second century after Buddha, he finds excessive, and rightly so, for these estimates rest on little more than conjecture and unreliable tradition. However sure, he says, we should like to be of the high antiquity of the oldest Buddhist texts, we cannot with certainty attribute a single one to Buddha. Out of the four or five thousand octavo pages comprised in the London edition of the Buddhist Pali canon, there are hardly twenty that, on the basis of historic evidence, can be carried back to within two hundred and fifty years of Buddha's death. But though contemporory documents are thus lacking to enable the student to give a thoroughly exact outline of what Buddha taught, yet there are elements in the earliest available texts that may be safely taken as constituents of primitive Buddhism. It is on the basis of these that the author reconstructs the system of salvation as propounded by Buddha. Nor does he hesitate to join issue with noted Buddhist scholars, as Oldenberg, and Rhys Davids, on such questions as the permanency of the ego after death, of continued existence in Nirvana. With good sense he rejects the view, only too common, that Buddha disbelieved in the existence of the soul, and denied that a man's conscious personality persisted after death. He also concludes that it is a mistake to hold with some modern scholars of Buddhism that, in the teaching of Buddha, Nirvana meant annihilation. Here he agrees with Professor Oldenberg that Buddha expressly avoided positive teaching on the nature of Nirvana as something irrelevant to the practical pursuit of perfection.

The two great rival sects into which Buddhism later split, with their characteristic schemes of salvation known as the Little and the Great Vehicle, are described in an interesting manner. The last chapter is devoted to a subject not generally treated in works on

Buddhism, the corruption of Buddhism by the infiltration of gross, even indecent elements, so-called Tantrism.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique, sous la direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule III, Concordats–Dieu. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1910.

In the third section of the *Apologetic Dictionary*, which has lately appeared, there is much to instruct and to interest the Catholic reader. In the article on Concordats, part of which appeared in the previous fascicle, the Abbé Dudon carries the history of the French Concordat down to its arbitrary rupture by the French government in 1905, followed by the unfair legislative acts of December 11, 1905, January 2, 1907, and April 11, 1908. The exposition of the controverted questions concerning the Sacrament of Confirmation is compressed by Father Guibert, S. J., into two pages. One might wish that a more extensive treatment had been given to this important subject. The seventeen-page article of the Abbé Moissant on Conscience could well have been reduced to give the needed room.

The History of the Convulsionaries of Saint Medard is told in an interesting manner by Bishop Waffelaert. Father Pinard, S. J., has a good article on Creation, and his confrère, Father Valensin, gives an able exposition and critique on Kant's method of criticism.

Biblical Criticism is handled by Father Durand, S. J., with no little ability and learning. It is the longest article of all, comprising twenty-nine pages. It is particularly rich in its indications of recent literature on this many sided and important subject.

Another long and very fine article is that on the Roman Curia. In this article, Professor Forget treats of Cardinals, while Father Choupin, S. J., describes the nature and distinctive work of the Congregations, Tribunals, and Offices.

Among other excellent contributions, the article of Dom Cabrol on Christian Worship, that of Father Munnynck, O. P., on Determinism, and that of Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., on God, only part of which appears in the present fascicle, deserve honorable mention. Readers of French will find in this dictionary a reference work of great value.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Les arguments de l'athéisme, par J. L. De la Paquerie. Paris, Bloud & Cie, 1909. 12mo, 64 pp.

This little brochure commends itself as a popular, succinct refutation of the various objections and counter-arguments that have been advanced to discredit theistic belief. They are grouped under several heads, the objections of Kant, those of Herbert Spencer, those of M. de Dantec, those of M. Hérbert, and finally, those of Büchner and of Loti. The author avoids as far as possible all technical terms of philosophy and of science, and thereby manages to give a series of refutations that the average man of the world can understand. An unfortunate typographical error has been made on page nine, which should be corrected. The author intends to say that there is but one being, God, for whom existence is a necessity, whereas for all contingent beings, it is possible to separate the notion, from the reality, of their existence. But through the printer's mistake, the contrary is expressed. "Pour tous les êtres, sauf un seul, il est *impossible* de separer l'idée de la realité, parce qu'ils sont contingents."

This booklet belongs to the apologetic series published by Bloud and Co., of Paris.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Theology of the Sacraments. A Study in Positive Theology, by the Very Rev. P. Pourrat, V. G., Rector of the Theological Seminary of Lyons (France). B. Herder, St. Louis and Freiburg (Baden), 1910.

This is an authorized translation from the third French edition of Father Pourrat's excellent "Theologie Sacramentaire," the first edition of which was published in 1907. This is a book that deserves to be warmly recommended, presenting as it does the happy combination of scholastic and positive theology prescribed by Pope Pius X as a remedy against the errors of Modernism. Who does not see the benefits to be derived from a study of the growth of a systematic sacramental theology, that is to say, the development of our knowledge of the sacraments? "The history of the development falls easily into four periods—from the beginning to St. Augustine; from St. Augustine to the twelfth century; from the twelfth century to the Council of Trent; and from the Council of Trent to our own day." Through these four periods the definition of a sacrament, the composition of the sacramental rite, the efficacy of the sacraments, etc.,—in

fact all important questions relating to the sacraments are investigated historically and dogmatically.

We fail to see what the author has gained by admitting that Christ instituted some sacraments "immediately but implicitly" (p. 301). The old formula used by theologians expressed the same truth as clearly as the new terminology. "The Church did not have from the beginning a *full and entire* (italics are in the original) consciousness of some sacraments" (*ibid.*) is a proposition that calls for the author's modifications and explanations; otherwise the words "*male sonans*" might occur to the minds of some readers.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

L'Eucharistie et la pénitence durant les six premiers siècles de l'Eglise, par G. Rauschen, professeur de théologie à l'Université catholique de Bonn. Traduit de l'allemand par Michel Decker, vicaire à Saint-Vincent-de-Paul, et E. Ricard, professeur au Grand Séminaire d'Aix. 1 vol. in-12. 3 frs. Librairie Victor Lecoffre, J. Gabalda et C^ie^, rue Bonaparte, 90, Paris.

Another volume giving some interesting and important chapters of positive theology (see notice of Pourrat's Theology of the Sacraments). That the learned professor's work is highly esteemed is shown by the fact that the book which appeared in 1908 was translated into Italian by Father Bonaccorsi last year and now appears in French. Both the Italian and French translators considered it necessary to make certain reservations in their praise of the original. The French admirer of M. Rauschen was specially anxious that Mgr. Battifol's opinions should be presented in their true colors. Fr. Bonaccorsi surpassed the Frenchman in his reservations and "corrective commentary;" yet both considered the work learned, useful and timely. In investigating early texts there is nearly always a diversity of opinion, even amongst the learned. The field of positive theology, especially in its present state, is one in which men must walk with cautious tread. If the pioneers who dare to blaze the way through this dangerous field should be lightly scratched by the underbrush or injured occasionally by falling limbs, those who are on the outside, awaiting the results of their efforts, should praise their courage, applaud their devotedness and pray for their success.

The French translator closes his preface with this admonition: This book is simply an elementary manual; it does not pretend to be

an exhaustive treatise on the subject discussed ; those who wish to make a more profound study must read the authors whose opinions are discussed in the manual.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

The Catholic Encyclopedia. Edited by Charles G. Herbermann, Ph. D., Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., Condé B. Pallen, Ph. D., Thomas J. Shahan, D. D., and John J. Wynne, S. J., Vol. VII. The Robert Appleton Company, New York. Pp. xv–800.

The seventh volume of this splendid work is in every respect worthy of its predecessors. As a Catholic glances over its pages, he can hardly help putting up a prayer of thanksgiving that at last fair-minded readers will find it possible to learn the truth about many things wherein the Church has so long been misunderstood. One might open the volume at random and he would scarcely fail to find something to strengthen his faith and to make him thankful that he is a Catholic.

The article "Hospitals" from the pen of Dr. James Walsh will be illuminating to many who are too apt to forget the glorious work of the Church in this field of philanthropy. Among the ancient Germans the sick and the feeble were often put to death. Among the Greeks and Romans something was done for the sick and here, as well as in ancient Egypt, the practice of medicine was associated with the temples and the priesthood. Christ's work of healing the sick and the work of the early Church, which was in line with His precept and example, registered a new phase of man's attitude towards the sick and the feeble. In early Christian times the Bishop's house was the center for the dispensation of Christian hospitality, to the poor and to the sick. In some cases the bishop was also a physician and gave medical attention to those of his guests who needed it. In a few highly condensed paragraphs Dr. Walsh outlines the development of the hospital from the very heart of Christian charity and under the guidance and control of the Church. In the ninth century we find Charlemagne helping to restore hospitals that had fallen into decay : "He further ordered that a hospital should be attached to each cathedral and monastery. . . . Innumerable Pontifical documents attest the zeal of the popes in behalf of hospitals. The Holy See extends its favor and protection to the charitable undertakings of the faithful in order to insure their success and to shield them against molestation from any source." The whole article shows the hospital in its origin and development as a distinctively Christian institution

whose legitimate growth was checked by the Protestant Reformation. "The injury inflicted upon the whole system of Catholic charities by the upheaval of the sixteenth century, was disastrous in many ways to the work of the hospitals. The dissolution of the monasteries, especially in England, deprived the Church in large measure of the means to support the sick and of the organization through which those means had been employed. Similar spoliations in Germany followed so rapidly on the introduction of the new religion that the reformers themselves found it difficult to provide anything like a substitute for the old Catholic foundations. Even Luther confessed more than once that under the Papacy generous provisions had been made for all classes of suffering, while among his own followers no one contributed to the maintenance of the sick and the poor."

The article on "Indulgences" will serve to correct many erroneous impressions of well-meaning people concerning the meaning and history of indulgences in the Catholic Church. Father Kent, realizing the importance of this, immediately after giving the derivation and meaning of the word, proceeds to state "what an indulgence is not.—To facilitate explanation, it may be well to state what an indulgence is not. It is not a permission to commit sin, nor a pardon of future sins; neither could be granted by any power. It is not the forgiveness of the guilt of sin; it supposes that the sin has already been forgiven. It is not an exemption from any law or duty, and much less from the obligation consequent on certain kinds of sin, *e. g.*, restitution; on the contrary, it means a more complete payment of the debt which a sinner owes to God. It does not confer immunity from temptation or remove the possibility of subsequent lapses into sin. Least of all is an indulgence the purchase of a pardon which secures the buyer's salvation or releases the soul of another from purgatory. The absurdity of such notions must be obvious to anyone who forms a correct idea of what the Catholic Church really teaches on the subject." This passage should be sufficient to cause people formerly holding these views of indulgences to read what the author has to say about "What an indulgence is," "Various kinds of indulgences," "Who can grant indulgences," "Dispositions necessary to gain an indulgence," "Authoritative teaching of the Church," "The power to grant indulgences," "Abuses," "Salutary effects of indulgences," etc., which are the headings of the various portions of the able article. The non-Catholic's eye will probably be caught by the following sub-heading, "Traffic in indulgences," and if he reads the paragraph, he will find the same candor and broad scholarship here that generally character-

izes the articles in the *Catholic Encyclopedia.* "These measures show plainly that the Church long before the Reformation, not only recognized the existence of abuses, but also used her authority to correct them. In spite of all this, disorders continued and furnished the pretext for attacks directed against the doctrine itself, no less than against the practice of indulgences. Here, as in so many other matters, the love of money was the chief root of the evil; indulgences were employed by mercenary ecclesiastics as a means of pecuniary gain. Leaving the details concerning this traffic to a subsequent article (see Reformation), it may suffice for the present to note that the doctrine itself has no natural or necessary connection with pecuniary profit, as is evident from the fact that the abundant indulgences of the present day are free from this evil association: the only conditions required are the saying of certain prayers or the performance of some good work or some practical piety."

We have spoken of the uses of the *Encyclopedia* to non-Catholics, but it will be at once apparent that articles such as those on Indulgences and on Infallibility will be of the greatest service to priests in the preparation of sermons and instructions, to teachers in expounding the truths of the Catholic religion, and to our Catholics in general who need reliable information, with references to the original documents and literature, in order to defend their faith against the constant and insidious attacks of agnosticism and materialism.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

A Quarter Century of Technical Education in New South Wales. William Applegate Gullick, Government Printer, Sydney, 1909. 4°, pp. viii–319.

This monograph, published on the occasion of an exhibition of students' work held at the Sydney Technical College, Easter week, 1909, will be of interest to those who are studying the widespread movement of technical education in the United States. The early part of the work is a review of technical education in the West. A chapter of this history is devoted to the study of technical education in the United States. The manual training movement in this country is reviewed and not always with unlimited praise: "The system of Manual Training in the primary schools of America is on a poorly coördinated plan; and, as practically followed out, is the logical and natural sequence of the kindergarten schools. The work is continued in the

high schools of America, and in towns of any pretensions the Manual Training High School is an institution of importance equal to that of the Academic High School." Naturally the thing that interests us most is the account which this volume gives of the present state of technical education in New South Wales. In the year 1908 there were 18,490 students registered in the technical schools. The Sydney Technical College, a picture of which is given, presents a splendid appearance. A full account is given of the work that is being attempted, of the various courses taught, down to the smallest details of the curriculum.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Practical Hints on Education to Parents and Teachers, translated from her original German work by Elise Flury. R. & T. Washbourne, London, 1910, Benziger Brothers, New York. Pp. viii–206. 76 cents net.

This is a little volume in non-technical language which presents some of the great fundamental truths concerning the early education of children. It will be welcomed by parents and primary teachers. The book in its German original has been very favorably received in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, and will doubtless prove valuable in this country also notwithstanding the differences in the home environment of the children. The author sounds a warning against non-denominational teaching and points to the havoc which it has wrought wherever the experiment has been made. She says: "Little less dangerous than a Godless school is a school where undenominational religious instruction is given. Absence of denomination amounts almost to absence of religion. Under the pretext of not giving offence to any denomination, no definite form is given to religious instruction. The fruit of such a proceeding is sometimes merely religious sentimentality, more often indifference or infidelity."

The book makes a plea for private or denominational schools as the only schools where justice may be done to the child's spiritual needs. "In them alone abides the full power to do justice to the rights of parents and taxpayers. Godless schools are a misfortune for the child, the family, the country." Of course the author recognizes the rights of the state. "The family, the state, the church—each of these educational factors has its rights, each has its duties in the matter of education. Great things—indeed all things—they can

achieve to further the beneficial work of education, if only they act in harmony. It would contribute to the peace of a country, and to the good of our children, if this were generally recognized."

The volume contains many practical hints for the care and management of children and we hope that it may find its way into many of our Catholic homes.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

The Rise of South Africa, Vol. I. By G. E. Cory. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, Bombay and Calcutta, 1910. Pp. 420, Index, Plans and Map.

It is proposed to write in four volumes a history of the origin of South African colonization and of South African development from the earliest times to the year 1857. Volume I brings the narrative down to 1820. In less than two pages the author disposes of the epoch-making discoveries of the Portuguese. The nature of the work requires a more ample account of the maritime activity of the Dutch, who as early as 1495 became commercial rivals of the Portuguese. In their frequent voyages to the East the Dutch became acquainted with the region near the Cape of Good Hope, a place at which they often took on board fresh meat and fresh water. It was not, however, until 1648 that they became fully convinced of the importance of establishing here a victualling station, and even then the first settlement was the result of an accident. In that year the crew of the *Haarlem* was wrecked on the shores of Table Bay. With the enterprise characteristic of their race they planted, fished and hunted until five months later a passing vessel took them to Holland. It was their good fortune to have been cast on that shore at the most delightful season of the year, and on their arrival in Holland they pointed out the advantages of the place. The Netherlands East India Company had been organized as early as 1602, but it was not until 1652, half a century later, that it established a fort at the Cape of Good Hope. The new settlers arrived at the beginning of the southern winter and were soon in the midst of difficulties. They believed that the climate and the resources of the Cape had been exaggerated, and it required much suffering, much patience and much industry before they were able to perceive any signs of actual prosperity.

The first permanent establishment at the Cape was a fort of which the garrison was composed of servants of the Company. In a short

time certain members of the garrison were authorized to take up for cultivation lands beyond the limits of the fort. Such was the beginning of what is now an important dependency of the British Empire and what, perhaps, is destined to become a great state.

To those familiar with the early experiences of white men in America, it is hardly necessary even to suggest the trials of the first European settlers in South Africa. As in America from the outset so in Africa, the great obstacle to the extension of civilization was the native. The Dutch first came into contact with the Strandloopers, a lazy and degraded Hottentot tribe that subsisted principally on shellfish and other products of the shore. Unlike the American Indian, these Hottentots were easily reduced to a condition of slavery. The system, however, was not rigorous, and there is no satisfactory proof that on the whole the Dutch were not humane masters. There is evidence, it is true, of a few exceptions. The Bojesmen or Bushmen, however, had no inclination toward a life of slavery but warred against the whites until they were themselves so reduced in number that it is now almost impossible to find in their old homes a pure-blooded deseendant of that dwarfish but warlike people. Before their extermination their poisoned arrows had killed many a Boer and for years they continued to carry off multitudes of cattle. But the real struggle, long a struggle for existence, was not with either Hottentots or Bushmen, but with the Kaffirs, a warlike and physically almost a giant race. The records show them to have been also an ungrateful, thievish and lying people. In their intercourse with these dangerous neighbors the Dutch observed the greatest circumspection, but neither kind treatment nor favors won their confidence. The Kaffir chiefs accepted gifts from the Dutch landdrost and showed their appreciation by robbing his countrymen. The return of the depredations for a single day, as late as June 30, 1810, showed 577 cattle stolen, also seven horses, besides the killing of seven Hottentot herdsmen. It was this condition that made of every Dutch farmer an uncomplaining and efficient soldier. For months at a time the heads of families were absent on commando. They generally furnished their own horses, food and equipment. Sometimes they were assisted by the government, but often the Kaffir was upon them before troops could be sent from the Cape. It was this perpetual warfare with the natives that produced the formidable Boer soldier.

When at last by patience, courage and industry the colonists were beginning to see signs of prosperity the British in 1795 seized the Cape. They feared that it might fall into the hands of France. In 1802, however, when France had allied herself with the Batavian

Republic it was surrendered to the Dutch. Finally in 1806 it was recaptured by the British and has since been held by them.

Much of this work treats of the murders and cattle raids of the Kaffirs, and the consequent interruption of agriculture. It discusses also the unscientific work of some early missionaries, the land tenures and the unrest resulting from British rule. If the style is not the best, it is still a good style, and the reader is everywhere impressed with the honesty and intelligence of the author. The work is of considerable historical value, especially to the student of colonial administration. In its pages he will see clearly the grave consequences of incapacity as well as the benefits of enlightened rule.

CHAS. H. MCCARTHY.

Theologia Brugensis. De Sponsalibus et Matrimonio Tractatus Canonicus et Theologicus, auctore Aloysio Desmet, S. T. L. Brugis, Beyaert, 1909. Pp. xxvii + 563.

To the substantial series of theological treatises given to the public by professors of the Seminary of Bruges, comprising such well-known works as Jungmann on Dogma, Van Steenkiste on Holy Scripture and Bouquillon's classical *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, there is now added this new volume *De Sponsalibus et Matrimonio* which is in every way worthy of the high company in which it appears and must be reckoned among the leading treatises on the important subject with which it deals.

It is not an easy task to produce a work which shall hold a prominent and permanent place in our abundant literature on marriage. It is, therefore, no small praise to say that Father Desmet has succeeded in accomplishing this. His book has the advantage of being the most up to date matrimonial treatise available ; it is thorough and complete, containing much for which we seek in vain in similar works ; it discusses marriage dogmatically and morally, as well as canonically ; the historical aspects of each topic are well developed ; citations and references are abundant ; the reader is furnished with an unusually good bibliography ; and the important modifications introduced by the *Ne Temere* are noted in their proper place.

From every point of view this is a most serviceable and valuable work, which everyone must have who desires to keep in touch with the best books in this department of sacred science.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

THE SCHOOL OF LAW—A CORRECTION.

WHEREAS, some statements in a previous circular have given to certain friends of the University the erroneous impression that its Law Department had retired from the work of training young lawyers for the Bar, attention is hereby directed to the fact that what the Law Department really *has* done is to provide more efficiently than ever for such training; *first,* by furnishing to its students a two years' course of study, under its own professors, in those branches of the law which are of universal application in all the States of the American Union; and *then* by permitting them to study for one year in law schools and offices in the States where they expect to practice, in order that they may there acquire that technical professional knowledge of the local laws and customs which is required for their admission to the Bar. This is the mode of Legal Education originally proposed by the University at its opening in 1895 (see *Catholic University Bulletin,* April, 1895, pp. 178-199), and which recent changes in the Bar Rules of the different States have rendered possible in all States, and in some States necessary.

BOOK NOTICES.

A specimen of contemporary literature well deserving of attention is the beautifully turned-out volume, published by the Copp, Clark Co., Limited, of Toronto, and containing a new complete edition of the POEMS of Charles G. D. Roberts. Most of these lyrics have the genuine ring. The opening piece, "Ave! An Ode for the Shelley Centenary," is quite in the grand manner. Mr. Roberts shows himself master of many metres.

The bulky volume of the POEMS OF ARCHIBALD LAMPMAN, edited with Memoir by Duncan Campbell Scott, and published by Morang and Co., Limited, Toronto, shows a sweet singer in various moods. Here we have sonnets, ballads, and other lyrics, and two long pieces, "David and Abigail, a Poem in Dialogue," and "The Story of an Affinity," both the latter in blank verse. Some of these poems are genuinely tender and pathetic, and are deserving of being widely known and read.

Another poetic volume from across the border is from the well-known publishing house of William Briggs, Toronto. It contains THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WILFRED CAMPBELL. Some of the pieces have already appeared in different high-class magazines, and others are new. All are on a high artistic level, and are typical of that lyric spirit which animates so much of modern verse.

In the pages of this *Bulletin* a good word was recently said of the ESSAYS of Thomas O'Hagan. His SONGS OF THE SETTLEMENT AND OTHER POEMS, also published by William Briggs, Toronto, display this versatile writer in quite a new light. Simple in subject and making no pretensions to belong to the great order, these lyrics are yet of the appealing kind and touch one with many emotions. The spirit of patriotism, of love for the great Canadian land, is everywhere apparent.

A third volume from Mr. Briggs's firm is THE COLLECTED POEMS OF ISABELLA VALANCY CRAWFORD, edited by J. W. Garvin, B. A., with Introduction by Ethelwyn Wetherald. Here no uncertain note is struck; the true poetic spirit vivifies and animates every piece in the book. It is to be regretted that one with a genius like Miss Crawford, a Dublin-born lady who spent 28 of her 36 years of life in Canada, was cut untimely off in her prime. What she has left, however, has vitality enough to endure and to give her a sure passport to fame.

In ENGLISH ACCENTUATION, by Rev. F. T. Barré, C. S. C., published by P. J. Kennedy and Sons, New York and Philadelphia, a thoroughly systematic attempt is made to deal with that most elusive and baffling of subjects—correct accentuation of English words. "There are no principles by which to determine the accent in English," wrote Noah Webster over forty years ago. After one has

gone carefully through Father Barré's work, one is inclined to doubt the truth of the dictum. Those who take the trouble to master it will have most of their difficulties removed.

Dr. Franz Keller, of Freiburg, publishes a collection of homilies on the Epistle to the Philippians, under the title SONNENKRAFT. It is brought out by Herder, and sells for fifty-five cents.

From the same publishing house comes a very timely pamphlet of eighty-six pages from the pen of the well known Jesuit, Father Alexander Baumgartner. The title is DIE STELLUNG DER DEUTSCHEN KATHOLIKEN ZUR NEUEREN LITERATUR. It will interest not only the Catholics of Germany, for whom it is primarily intended, but also American Catholics who speak and read German. It sells for twenty-seven cents.

In Germany as well as elsewhere, the conversion of distinguished scholars to the Catholic religion always commands a good deal of interest both within and without the Church. The line of thought which finally led them to Catholicism, and the considerations which prepared them for the acceptance of the gift of faith furnish the best kind of apologetic literature. The story of a conversion of this kind is told in the little book ZURÜCK ZUR HEILIGEN KIRCHE by Dr. Albert von Ruville, Professor at the University of Halle. It is published by Herder, and the price is eighty-five cents.

A new edition of Father Vermeersch's PRACTICAL DEVOTION TO THE SACRED HEART, published by Benziger, and a course of sermons for first Fridays, entitled THE FRUITS OF THE DEVOTION TO THE SACRED HEART by Rev. William Graham, published by Wagner, are among recent editions to devotional literature. There has appeared also a new edition of the RACCOLTA by Father Ambrose St. John. It is published in London by Burns and Oates and in this country by Benziger Brothers, New York, Chicago and Cincinnati.

A very curious medley of scientific fact and more or less scientific interpretation of facts is to be found in the work THE WONDERS OF THE UNIVERSE, by James L. Meagher, D. D. It is published by The Christian Press Association, New York. It treats of a wide range of subjects, and describes the marvels of nature in a popular manner; the use, however, which it makes of the facts which it describes is not always scientific nor always philosophical.

The latest volume of the series PULPIT COMMENTARY ON CATHOLIC TEACHING contains a collection of fifty-one sermons on *The Means of Grace*. The publisher is Joseph F. Wagner, New York.

A little book from the pen of Father Betten, S. J., which bears the title THE ROMAN INDEX OF FORBIDDEN BOOKS sums up recent legislation on the Index and presents in a convenient form information which is scattered through more

extensive volumes on that subject by Dr. Hurley, Father Vermeersch, Father Hilgers, etc. It is published by Herder, and costs thirty-five cents.

The well-known Catholic publishing house of Pustet has issued a new edition of Monsignor Capel's FAITH OF CATHOLICS. It is in three stately octavo volumes, and constitutes in itself a library of popular apologetics. The General Index at the end of the third volume adds to its usefulness as a work of reference.

From the Paris house, Pierre Téqui (82 Rue Bonaparte) comes the tenth edition of Abbé Maynard's VERTUS ET DOCTRINE SPIRITUELLE DE S. VINCENT DE PAUL. The success that this little volume has had in France is the best proof of its excellence.

Preachers, lecturers, advanced catechists and the clergy, especially in our large cities, will welcome a new twenty-five cent edition of QUESTIONS OF SOCIALISTS AND THEIR ANSWERS, by Rev. William S. Krebs, Priest of the Ohio Apostolate. The book is provided with a Preface from the pen of the Archbishop of Milwaukee. It is for sale at 6914 Woodland Ave., S. E., Cleveland, O.

An able and learned plea for frequent communion is to be found in THE EUCHARISTIC TRIDUUM, translated from the French of Father Lintelo, S. J., by Father Zulueta, S. J. It is published by Washbourne, London, and sold by Benziger, New York.

Among the latest liturgical publications of the Pustets are two editions of OFFICIUM ET MISSA PRO DEFUNCTIS and the 1910 edition of the MISSALE ROMANUM.

The story of Father Damien's heroic self-sacrifice is charmingly told in a recent volume of the St. Nicholas Series entitled DAMIEN OF MOLOKAI by May Quinlan. The series is published by Benziger Brothers.

The average boy is difficult to please in the matter of fiction. What he reads should not be too evidently intended for his edification. It must, of course, be clean, healthy and free from lurid sensationalism, while, equally of course, it must interest and entertain before it can profit him in any way. Father Garrold, S. J., in THE BOYS OF ST. BATTS' succeeds as well as his rivals in this class of literature, in combining the qualities which go to make up a good story for boys. His book is published by Benziger Brothers.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Publications by Alumni. Among the *Book Reviews* in this number of the *Bulletin* are notices of Father Schuyler's *Courage of Christ* and of a new edition of Father Holland's *Divine Story*. Signs of literary activity among the clerical Alumni of the University are multiplying day by day, and is one of many indications that the work of the University is telling in the intellectual and spiritual life of the country. In the May number of the *Bulletin* appeared a notice of a work, *Bibliography of the Chinese Question,* by a lay alumnus of the University, Mr. Boutwell Dunlap. Just as this number is going to press there comes to the office a very interesting volume entitled *Astronomical Essays,* by Rev. George V. Leahy, S.T.L., of Boston, another alumnus of the University. The work will be reviewed in the October *Bulletin.*

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. At the Meeting of the Board of Trustees held Wednesday, April 7, Reverend Doctor Patrick J. Healy, Associate Professor of Church History, was appointed Ordinary Professor of Church History in the School of Sacred Sciences on the Quinn Chair. Dr. Joseph Dunn, Associate Professor of Celtic Language and Literature was appointed Ordinary Professor of Celtic Language and Literature on the A. O. H. Chair.

The Rector was authorized to proceed at once to the erection of a central lighting and heating plant which will afford improved facilities for the work of the Department of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering.

The Michael Cudahy Chair of Mathematics was declared established in honor of Michael Cudahy, of Chicago, who, several years ago, presented fifty thousand dollars to the University for the purpose of endowment.

The Board encouraged the maintenance of a suitable Athletic Field.

The Summer School for Catholic teachers which the Board at its November meeting authorized to be opened in the summer of 1910, was postponed until the summer of 1911.

New Instructors. The following Instructors have been appointed in the School of Science: Mr. Lewis Henry Crook, B.S., Instructor in Mechanical Engineering; Mr. George Alphonsus Weschler, B.S., Instructor in Mechanical Engineering; Mr. Henry Bernhard Froning, A.B., Assistant in General Chemistry; Mr. Clarence Edward Baltzley, Assistant in Metallurgy and Assaying.

The Gymnasium. Work has been begun in the remodeling of the temporary gymnasium and, before the middle of September, when the football team will report for practice, everything will be in readiness.

Athletics is still very much to the fore in the lay section of the University. The series of successes which attended the career of the baseball team in the early part of the season was crowned by a second decisive victory over the Georgetown team on May 18, the score being three to one. The members of the team will all return to the University at the opening of the next session, and several additional names of academic athletic fame will be added to the list.

Alumni Meeting. The Alumni Association of the Catholic University of America will hold its annual meeting at Rauscher's on June 7th, and the members will be entertained at the University on Commencement Day, June 8th.

Lecture on Probation. On May 26, Doctor Charles F. McKenna, of New York, lectured at McMahon Hall on Probation.

The Library. From the Librarian's Report, which is now in the hands of the Rector, we learn that during the present

scholastic year the Library has acquired 2,165 volumes, 1,240 of which were gifts. Among the most important large collections acquired by gift is the set, in 325 bound volumes, of the publications of the learned societies of Berlin, Vienna, Leipzig, etc. This is a gift from several of the Most Reverend and Right Reverend Members of the Board of Trustees. Another valuable gift is the *Paléographie musicale,* presented by Mr. Francis E. Riggs. Complete sets of the *Bradshaw Liturgical Texts* and the *Early English Text Publications* were presented by a friend of the University, who does not wish to have his name published. Among recent purchases is the *Rolls Series* in 251 volumes. Both for the number of gifts and for the number of volumes purchased this has been a record year in the Library.

Catholic Summer School. At the Catholic Summer School, Plattsburg, N. Y., the following lectures by University Professors are scheduled for the coming session:

PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION.

By Rev. Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., D. D.,
Professor of Philosophy.

July 11—The Meaning of Education.
July 12—The Function of Educational Ideals;
July 13—Cultural and Vocational Aims;
July 14—The Mind of the Child;
July 15—Body and Mind;
July 18—Necessity and Value of Method;
July 19—The Content of the Curriculum;
July 20—Moral and Religious Training;
July 21—Institutions that Educate: the Home; the School; the Church;
July 22—Qualifications of the Teacher.

HISTORY OF EDUCATION.

By Rev. William Turner, D. D.,
Professor of Logic, Metaphysics, and History of Philosophy.

July 25—Education Dominated by Imitation and Tribal Custom;
July 26—Education Dominated by Caste, National Tradition, and Religious Ideals—Hindustan, China, Egypt;

July 27—Education for Citizenship—Persia and Sparta;
July 28—Education for Excellence According to Human Standards—Athens and Rome;
July 29—Christian Education as Preserving and Transcending the Earlier Ideals;
August 1—Assertion of the Supremacy of Spiritual Interests in the Struggle of Christianity with Pagan Culture—Preservation of the Classics;
August 2—Assertion of the Same Principle in Monasticism: Influence of the Monks on Civilization;
August 3—Assertion of the Same Principle in Professional and Craft Education—The Guilds;
August 4—Assertion of the Same Principle in the Institutes of Chivalry—Status of Woman in Medieval Times;
August 5—Assertion of Supremacy of the Spiritual in Philosophical and Theological Education—Rise and Spread of the Universities.

PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION.

By Rev. Thomas Edward Shields, Ph. D., LL. D.,
Professor of Education.

August 8—Sources of Mental Food;
August 9—The Function of Education in Mental Development;
August 10—The Teacher's Part in the Educative Process;
August 11—From the Static to the Dynamic;
August 12—The Plastic Individual;
August 15—The Source of Energy in Mental Development;
August 16—Strength and Docility;
August 17—Environment and Mental Growth;
August 18—Mental Growth and Mental Development;
August 19—Balances in Development.

The Debating Society. The first annual banquet of the Debating Society of the Catholic University was held in Albert Hall on the twenty-fifth of April. Dr. Spensley was the host of the Society. Dinner was followed by a smoker, during which a number of speeches were made both by the members of the Society and their guests.

Monsignor Shahan, being out of the city on the occasion, was unhappily prevented from attending. Other guests of the Society were Dr. Melody, Dr. Turner, Dr. McCarthy, Dr. O'Hara, and Professor Thompson, all of whom, except the latter,

had previously acted as judges at the debates. Each of them gave the Society a short extemporaneous talk.

The speeches were opened by Mr. Donald Gallagher, president of the Society, who acted as toastmaster. Dr. Spensley spoke next, and the guests of the Society followed here and there during the evening in the order given above. Dr. Lennox, moderator of the Society, made the closing remarks.

The regular program was as follows:

An Expression from our Host..Rev. John Spensley, D.D.
Ramblings.....James Ivers, Jr.
Athletics.....James B. Dempsey.
Present and Future.....Charles Tansill.
College Spirit.....John Clancy.
Random shots.....John Daly.
University Oddities.....James Dougherty.

The evening as a whole was better enjoyed than any of a similar kind within the memory of the present students.

On Friday the thirteenth of May a recital was given by Mr. Koehler, Professor of Public Speaking. Professor Koehler's unusual ability was heartily appreciated and applauded. Hamlet's Soliloquy, and a "take off" on an Italian Opera Company, made perhaps the greatest impression of the evening.

The Society will give a public debate on the evening of Wednesday, June 1st. The question will be:

> "*Resolved*: That it is advisable that Senate Bill 5876, as passed by the Senate should be enacted into a law." This bill is the one introduced into the Senate by Senator Carter, providing for the establishment of Postal Savings Banks.

Messrs. Raymond Caverly of Minnesota and Joseph Boillin of Tennessee, will uphold the affirmative, Messrs. Donald Gallagher of Texas and Charles Tansill of Washington, the negative. Monsignor Shahan will preside.

A prize of $50.00 has been offered by the Rector of the University to the winning side. The Rector has, moreover, posted a similar prize for a like contest to be held next year.

The Debating Society, which has proved a success beyond expectations, last week elected officers for the coming year. These are, Moderator, Professor Lennox, head of the Department of English; President, Mr. John Clancy of New York; Vice-President, Mr. Cornelius O'Keefe of Kansas; Secretary-Treasurer, Mr. James Woods of Connecticut.

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